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Martyn et al.: Ohio's Advance Directive Laws

REDRAFTING OHIO'S ADVANCE DIRECTIVE LAWS
by
SUSAN R. MARTYN,* JAMES E. REAGAN,**
BRENDAN MINOGUE,*** DEBRA L. DIPPEL,****
MARIA R. SCHIMER,***** ROBERT TARASZEWSKI.******
INTRODUCTION

The Bioethics Network of Ohio (BENO) held its second annual conference
on June 12, 1992 at Ohio Dominican College, Columbus, Ohio. Attendees
recommended that a Task Force' review Ohio's Durable Power of Attorney for
Health Care (DPAHC) and Modified Uniform Rights for the Terminally IlI
(MURTIA) laws and suggest changes that would retain the basic structure of
these provisions but also simplify and clarify their meaning. The Task Force
completed a draft in six months and circulated it to approximately 450 individual
and institutional BENO members. About one hundred members responded and
this article incorporates most of their comments.
TASK FORCE OBJECTIVE: PATIENT-CENTERED LAWS

The Task Force studied similar laws in other states 2 and reviewed the
Uniform Rights of the Terminally Ill Act, 3 which formed the basis for Ohio's
living will and non-declarant Provisions. 4 These comparisons clarified our belief
that Ohio's advance directive laws are not sufficiently patient-centered.
I
Anderson-Fornoff Professor of Law and Values, The University of Toledo College of Law.
*
Research support for this article was provided by an endorsement funded by Eugene N. Balk and The Anderson
Group.
**
Director, Center for Ethics, St. Elizabeth Hospital Medical Center; Ph.D. 1985 Religion, Emory
University.
***
Professor of Philosophy and Religious Studies, Youngstown State University; Ph.D. Philosophy
1974, Ohio State.
****
Staff Attorney, Office of Legal Affairs, Northeastern Ohio Universities' College of Medicine, J.D.
1992, Akron.
General Counsel, Northeastern Ohio Universities' College of Medicine, J.D. 1983, Akron.
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Pulmonary Medicine and Nutrition Support Consultant, Akron General Medical Center; MD, 1985,
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*
Northeastern Ohio Universities' College of Medicine.
2
Al states and the District of Columbia have now enacted some form of Advanced Directive Provision. One
member of the Task Force collected and studied these laws, and provided charts that compared Ohio's
provisions with those in other jurisdictions.
3UNIF. RIGHTS OF THE TERMINALLY ILL ACT (1989). [Hereinafter cited as URTIA]. Uniform laws are
recommended by the National Conference of Commissioners on State Laws, a group of knowledgeable
practicing attorneys, judges, and legal scholars who advocate uniformity in state laws in private subject law
areas where people interact without governmental interference. Ohio, like most other states, has adopted over
four dozen of these proposed Uniform laws. See Lee McCorkle, Celebrating 100 Years of Excellence: The
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State laws, OHIO LAWYER 16 (May-June 1992).
ASee OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2133.01-.15 (Anderson 1991).
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Accordingly, it became our objective to draft revisions to the laws which would
make them so. 5 Bearing in mind that objective, four key goals emerged:
"Respect": Our laws should effectively respect the expressed and known or
unexpressed and inferred wishes, interests and values of patients.
"Permission": Our laws should clearly permit designated surrogates in
certain situations to activate processes and make decisions for implementing,
withholding and withdrawing medical treatments.
"Simplicity": Our laws should be sufficiently simple so that patients,
surrogates, physicians, and facilities can understand and reasonably comply with
them.
"Protection":

Our laws should protect vulnerable, incommunicative
patients from many evils, including negligence, fraud, greed and malice, as well
as guard the same patients against the evils of "overtreatment": unwanted,
ineffective, artificial, end-stage medical treatment.
In light of these key goals, patient-centered Ohio advance directive laws
should guarantee competent citizens of majority age the right to a living will that
expresses their wishes about medical treatment when they are incompetent and in
a terminal condition or in a permanently unconscious state. The laws should also
permit appropriate surrogates to consent to or refuse medical treatment for nondeclarant patients to whom the laws apply. The laws should also afford Ohio
citizens the right to appoint an attorney-in-fact empowered to make medical
decisions on their behalf whenever that person loses decisionmaking capacity.
The general structure of Ohio's current advanced directive laws do address
these concerns. One set of provisions recognizes the validity of living wills that
allow competent patients to speak concerning future end-of-life medical
decisions. 6 Another set of provisions, called durable power for health care, offers
competent adults a form to designate another person to make medical decisions
on their behalf if they become incapacitated.7 A final section recognizes a
hierarchy of appropriate decisionmakers for those seriously ill non-declarants
who have not executed a documentA

5

The complete version of our proposed changes to Ohio's Durable Power of Attorney law, §§ 1337.13-.17, can
be found in Appendix A, infra. The complete version of our proposed changes to Ohio's living will and nondeclarant law, §§ 2133.01-.15, can be found in Appendix B, infra.
6
§§ 2133.02-.07, .11-.15.

7§§ 1337.11-.17.
8§ 2133.08(B).
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Although the basic structure found in current Ohio law is sound, many of
the actual provisions contain excessive, burdensome and often incomprehensible
restrictions on complying with a patient's or surrogate's requests to avoid
aggressive, end-of-life medical heroics. These provisions improperly bury
specific permissions for patients and surrogates beneath stifling restrictions on
them and their physicians and facilities, creating an idiosyncratic web of
9
regulation not found in any other state's advanced directive provisions. Our
suggested revisions retain the structure and gist of the important safeguards of
current Ohio law. We also propose, however, both deletions and additions that
will more clearly grant permission for patients to execute documents, permission
for physicians to comply with documents and permission for appropriate
surrogates to decide in the absence of documents.' 0
PROPOSED GENERAL REVISIONS OF CURRENT LAWS
A.

Objection Procedures

Comparing Ohio's law to that of fifty other jurisdictions reveals several
obvious contrasts. Most striking is the fact that Ohio's provisions are at least two
to three times longer than those of any other jurisdiction. Most of the extra
verbiage in Ohio law describes a complex and cumbersome probate court
procedure that may be invoked by relatives of a terminally ill patient to object to
the validity of that person's written document.
Our task force recognizes that there will be situations where a concerned
individual believes that a proposed decision does not comport with the patient's
interests. We discovered, however, that all other states respond to this concern
with general guardianship laws which permit an interested person to seek review
of a surrogate decision at any time by requesting a guardianship hearing in a
Following this more straightforward approach of all other
probate court."

9

Several recent articles compare existing state advance directive laws. See e.g., Charles P. Sabatino, Death in
the Legislature: Inventing Legal Toolsfor Autonomy, 19 REVIEW OF LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE 309 (199192); Cathaleen A. Roach, Paradox and Pandora'sBox: The Tragedy of Current Right-to-Die Jurisprudence.25
U. MICH. J. L. REF. 133 (1991).
10
The Prefatory Note to the Uniform Rights of the Terminally 1ll Act identifies the same goals:
'"The purposes of the Act are (1) to establish a procedure which is simple, effective and acceptable to
persons who desire to execute a declaration, (2) to provide a statutory framework that is acceptable to
physicians and health care facilities whose conduct will be affected, (3) to provide for the effectiveness
of a declaration in states other than the state in which it is executed through uniformity of scope and
procedure, and (4) to avoid the inconsistency in approach that has characterized early statutes in the
area."
URTIA, supra note 3, prefatory note (1992).
1lSee OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2111.02(A)(Anderson 1991).
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jurisdictions, we have drafted substitute language that grants those who wish to
12
object a probate court hearing.
B.

Notification Provisions

Ohio's current laws require physicians to notify certain persons before
complying with valid advance directives as a means of allowing them to object to
the implementation of the patient's wishes.' 3 In the case of a patient with a valid
Ohio living will, however, we would retain the requirement that the attending
physician notify the person(s) named in the document of his or her intention to
comply with the directive.' 4 Only a handful of other states impose such
notification duties on attending physicians.15 We propose that these stipulations
regarding notification and waiting periods, except notification of a named person
in a living will, be deleted from both the DPAHC and MURTI laws' 6 because
these duties are burdensome, unclear, intrusive and unnecessary.
Consider first the person who executes a durable power of attorney for
health care, naming another person as attorney-in- fact. When an individual
executes such a document the named attorney-in-fact is the declarant's legitimate
surrogate. The attending physician should be able to elicit informed consent
from the attorney-in-fact in compliance with the document. The current statutory
requirement that the physician notify additional persons upon the patient's
deterioration into a "terminal condition" or "permanently unconscious state"
suggests otherwise. 17 This requirement is confusing and excessively restrictive,
both because it undermines the patient's naming of a specific, trusted surrogate,
and because there is no obvious need for communication with additional persons
when the attorney-in-fact is present and accountable. Any additional notification
duties unnecessarily delay, complicate and discourage compliance by physicians
with advance directives or surrogate decision-makers.
As previously noted, current Ohio laws also allow a person who executed a
living will to name a person to be notified if the declarant is subsequently
diagnosed as suffering from either "terminal condition" or "permanently
unconscious state" (PUS).'s This provision respects patient autonomy and should
be retained. However, other sections in the current living will law mandates
additional consultation with third parties even when a declarant has not named
12See proposed
13

§

1337.16(E) infra Appendix A. See also proposed § 2133.08(F) infra Appendix B.

Ol-O REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2133.05(AX2XI)-(3), 2133.08(E)(lXAnderson 1991).

14§ 2133.05(A)(2)(aXi).
15COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-18-107 (1989); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 91-283(8) (West 1991); ILL. REV.
STAT. ANN. ch. 755, § 40/25 (Smith-Hurd 1992); NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-3414 (1992).
16 See supra note 18.
17OHIOREV. CODE ANN. § 1337.16(DXI),(E) (Anderson 1991).
18§ 2133.05(A)(2Xa)(i).
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them. 19 This requirement causes confusion because it fundamentally contradicts
legitimate assumptions and expectations about living wills. Individuals who
execute living wills typically understand the document to be a statement directed
to their physicians that expresses their rights, wishes, interests and values.
Declarants expect that their living wills will speak for them when they are
permanently unconscious or in a terminal condition and unable to communicate
their wishes. They draft the document to assure that all persons involved will
comply with their wishes. We believe these assumptions and expectations on the
part of declarants are accurate, reasonable and justified.
Current Ohio laws add an additional burden to patient wishes by forbidding
the withholding or withdrawing of life-sustaining interventions for 48 hours
following an otherwise legally legitimate decision to comply with a valid
advance directive.20 The practical effect of this requirement is that patients who
have already declared personally or through a designated surrogate that they wish
to forego life-sustaining-treatment must be resuscitated and/or otherwise
aggressively treated until 48 hours pass, only after which time may available
medical treatments be withheld and withdrawn.
This legal requirement is both too permissive and too restrictive. Usually,
these provisions unnecessarily restrict patient wishes, because they force patients
to accept medical care that they may legitimately refuse and often already have.
It also forces Ohio's physicians to implement aggressive life-sustaining medical
treatments which they otherwise legitimately would not implement, and which
they will generally withdraw after 48 hours. 21 In a situation where a concerned
person expresses worry over whether a proposed decision really respects the
patient's wishes, however, a physician need wait only two days for dissent. As
long as no formal complaint is filed, the doctor may then proceed to remove life
supports immune from scrutiny.
We prefer an objection right framed instead by Ohio's general guardianship
laws, which are not limited by such restrictive time periods. 22 We have drafted
language for the living will, durable power of attorney and non-declarant laws
that clarifies the availability of his guardianship option without time limit. 23 Our
language is borrowed from that of similar Nebraska and Oregon provisions 24 and
19§§ 2133.05(A)(2)(a)(ii)-(B).
20§ 1337.16(D)(3)-(4), § 2133.05(A)(3)-(B).
21 This problem may be especially acute in emergency situations. Some states expressly provide for this
circumstance in their advance directive laws. See e.g., UrAH CODE ANN. § 75-2-4-05.5 (1993) [Special firm to
direct emergency medical service providers to withhold all life-sustaining procedures]. Ct. OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 1337.16 (CO; § 2133.141 (C) (4) (Anderson 1991).
22 See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2111.02 (A) (Anderson 1991).
23
See proposed § 1337.16(E); infra Appendix A; proposed §§ 2133.05 (B), 2133.08 (F) infra Appendix B.
24 NEB. REV.STAT. § 30-3421, 22 (1992); ORE. REV. STAT. § 127.550 (1989).
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parallels the group of specific persons listed in current Ohio law who have
25
standing to object.
C.

Non-related Decisionmakers

We propose that "adult with a significant personal relationship" be added to
the prioritized list of surrogates and objectors. The priority of surrogates in the
26
current laws, spouse, children, parents, adult siblings and nearest adult relative,
does not provide for patients who have none of these relationships, or who have
them but whose interests, wishes and values are not served by these relationships.
There are patients, in short, whose only or best surrogate is an adult with whom
27
they have a significant personal relationship.
D.

Do Not Resuscitate Orders

We recommend that specific language authorizing Do Not Resuscitate
(DNR) Orders be added. 28 Prior to the passage of our current advance directive
laws, it was customary and accepted in Ohio that physicians could write and
implement DNR Orders following informed communication with a patient or
legitimate surrogate. The current laws cast legal doubt upon this custom by
requiring 48 hours to pass between consent to withhold or withdraw lifesustaining interventions and implementation of such consent.
Any time-based limitation on implementing DNR orders is burdensome and
unnecessarily restrictive. DNR orders represent a decision not to redress cardiopulmonary arrest, a condition unique among life-threatening events by virtue of
its suddenness. Physicians cannot often predict it, nor can they "postpone" it by
"managing" it for 48 hours. Indeed, physicians are discouraged by their
profession from "semi-aggressively managing" cardio-pulmonary arrest: the
"slow code" is now considered bad medicine. 29
Cardio-pulmonary arrest must be either immediately treated or immediately
allowed to occur via DNR Orders. To delay the implementation of DNR orders
for any period of time often means starting other aggressive life-sustaining
measures such as the ventilator and its accompanying technologies, with the
25 OHIOREV. CODE ANN. § 1331.16(D); § 2133.05(A); § 2133.08(A).
2 6

OHIO REV.CODE ANN. § 2133.08(B) (Anderson 1991).

27 Several other states have similar provisions. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 765.401(West Supp. 1993); ILL.
Ann. STAT. ch. 755, § 40/25 (Smith-Hurd 1992).
28 DPA: See proposed § 1337.16(D) infra Appendix A. Nondeclarant:

See proposed § 2133.08(E) infra

Appendix B. Living Will: See proposed § 2133.12(D) infra Appendix B. The language in these provisions
was adapted from N.J. REV. STAT. ANN. § 26:2H-68 (West Supp. 1993).
29
See Andrew L. Evans & Baeuch A. Brody, The Do-Not-Resusitate Order in Teaching Hospitals, 253 JAMA
2236 (1985); Stuart J. Youngner et. al, Do Not Resusitate Orders, Incidents and Implications in a Medical
Intensive Care Unit, 253 JAMA 5 (1985).
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potential that everything will later have to be withdrawn. In customary clinical
practice, DNR Orders take effect at the moment they are written. Ohio's laws
should reflect this, and should not impose a legal delay in implementation of the
orders.
E.

Dun, to Transfer

In cases of a physician's or facility's non-compliance with an effective
document, we suggest that language creating an affirmative duty to assist in
transfer of care should replace the current language which establishes a duty not
to obstruct transfer. 3° Such language would be consistent with the statutes in all
states that follow URTIA which include in their advance directives laws an
affirmative duty to transfer care.31 We believe that the current limited duty not to
obstruct transfer of care of the patient to another physician and/or facility is not
sufficiently patient-centered because many patients and surrogates are
uninformed, reluctant, intimidated, or otherwise handicapped in requesting and
effecting transfer of care. We believe that creating an affirmative duty for the
non-compliant physician or facility to take reasonable measures to find another
physician or facility better serves the rights, wishes, interests and values of
patients and surrogates in these cases.
PROPOSED SPECIFIC REVISIONS
In addition to the overall problems created by provisions that appear
throughout Ohio's advanced directive laws described in the last section, our task
force also found specific remediable problems in each set of provisions regarding
the durable power of attorney for health care, living will and non-declarant
provisions of current Ohio law.
A.

Durable Powers of Attorney for Health Care:
The Scope of the Attorney-in-Fact'sAuthority

Ohio's durable power of attorney for health care law limits the power of
designated surrogates to make decisions regarding life-sustaining treatment to
patients who suffer from either a "terminal condition" or "permanently
unconscious state." 32 While these restrictions are typically found in state living
will and non-declarant laws, the durable power of attorney for health care statutes

30 OHIOREV. CODE ANN.

§§ 1337.16(B)(2)(a); 2133.10(A) (Anderson 1991).

31 URTIA, supra note 3, § 8 provides: "An attending physician or other health-care provider who is unwilling
to comply with this [Act] shall take all reasonable steps as promptly as practicable to transfer care of the
declarant to another physician or health-care provider who is willing to do so."
32 OHIOREV. CODE ANN § 1337.13(B)(1).
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of thirty-nine other states are not so limited. 33 These states have enacted true
health care proxy laws that afford citizens the right to appoint a surrogate to act
whenever that person loses capacity to direct his or her own medical care.
Health care proxy and living will laws differ in important ways. The former
allows a citizen to grant and restrict the authority of a surrogate decisionmaker.
The latter allows a person to express wishes about life-sustaining treatment at the
end of life to caregivers without reliance on a surrogate. Ohio currently confuses
these two kinds of laws by including "living will" restrictions in our durable
power of attorney for health care provisions. The practical impact of this
confusion is that Ohio citizens are deprived legitimate choice between two kinds
of documents.
There is good reason why other jurisdictions do not limit the appointed
surrogate's scope of authority. 34 They recognize that patients can and often do
lose decisionmaking capacity intermittently throughout their lives. This
potentiality motivates persons who execute durable powers of attorney for health
care to be able to control their own grant of decisionmaking authority. The vast
majority of states legitimize such an expectation by providing that the appointed
surrogate will have the same power to make all health care decisions the
principal possesses, subject to any limitations or statement of desires expressed
by the principal in the document. 35 Ohio's law does allow the principal to impose

33 ARIZ REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-3223 (Supp. 1992); Cal. Civil Code §§ 2432(aX1), 2433 (West 1993); COLO.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-14-506 (West Supp. 1992); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16 § 2502(b) & (c) (1983); D.C.
CODE ANN. §§ 21-2205, 21-2206 (1989); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 765.202, 765.203 (west Supp. 1993); GA.
CODE ANK § 31-36-4 (1991); HAW. REV. STAT. § 551D-2.5(c)(Supp. 1992); IDAHO CODE § 39-4505 (1993);
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 755 ILCS 45/4-3 (Smith-Hurd 1992); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 30-5-5-16(2), 30-5-5-17 (West
Supp. 1992); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 144B.1, 144B.2 (West Supp. 1993); KAN STAT. ANN. § 58-629 (Supp.
1992); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 311.970(6), 311.978 (Supp. 1992); 1993 MD. LAWS 372, §§ 5-602, 5-603
(Form 11); MASS. GEN. LAWS. ANN. ch. 201D, § 5 (west Supp. 1993); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 700.496
(west Supp. 1993); MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-41-165 (Supp. 1992); MO. ANN. STAT. § 404.820 (Vernon Supp.
1993); MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-9-103 (1991); NEV. REV. STAT. § 449.850(2) (1989); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 137-j:2, 137-j:14 (Supp. 1992); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:2H-53 (West Supp. 1993) (Michie 1993) N.M. STAT.
ANN., § 45-5-501; N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2982 (McKinney Supp. 1993); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 32A-19
(1992); N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-06.5-03 (1991 & Supp. 1993); OR. REV. STAT. § 127.540 (1989); R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 23-4.10-2 (1989); S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-5-504(D) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1992); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
ANN. § 59-7-2.5 (Supp. 1992); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 34-6-204, 34-6-205 (1991); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM.
CODE ANN. § 135.002 (West Supp. 1993); Vr. STAT. ANN. tit. 14 §§ 3453, 3465 (1989 & Supp. 1992); VA.
CODE ANN. § 54.1-2984 (1991 & Supp. 1993); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 11.94.010(3) (West Supp. 1993);
W. VA. CODE § 16-30A-4 (1991); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 155.20 (West Supp. 1993); WYO. STAT. § 3-5-202
(1993).
34
The only other limitation found in both Ohio's law and the statutes of the vast majority of their jurisdictions
creates a special decision making standard for principals who are pregnant. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1337.13
(D).
35 A few of these jurisdictions require that a patient who wishes to grant the power to make decisions
concerning life-sustaining treatment or artificial nutrition and hydration expressly state his or her intent in the
document. See e.g., MICK COMP. LAWS ANN. § 700.496(7)(d) (West Supp. 1993); MO. ANN. STAT. §
404.820 (Vernon Supp. 1993); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2982(2) (McKinney Supp. 1993); OR. REV. STAT. §
127.540(6X1989). These are reasonable provisions in a living will law and we have retained them in our
suggested redraft of Ohio's Living Will law. See proposed §§ 2133.02 (2), (3)(a) infra Appendix B. Required
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol26/iss2/5
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restrictions on the attorney-in-fact and we agree that this grant of power respects
the individuality of different persons in different situations. We find Ohio's law
objectionable, however, because it additionally imposes restrictions on the
principal that prevent a transfer of decisionmaking authority regarding lifesustaining treatment to surrogates unless a patient is in a terminal condition or
permanently unconscious state. 36
We observe that these restrictions in Ohio's durable power of attorney law
provoke an odd, undesirable and unnecessary state of affairs. Citizens who write
durable powers of attorney for health care in Ohio intend to preserve personal
rights, but they lose them when they execute this document. The restrictions in
Ohio's durable power for health care law arbitrarily confine the expression of the
common-law right to refuse life-sustaining medical treatment to possession of
decisional capacity, thereby compelling medical treatments for decisionally
incapacitated patients that they might have refused when they could still speak
for themselves.
Consider the tragically common situations of cancer, heart disease and
nursing home placement. A diagnosis of cancer is often accompanied by
recommendations of treatments such as surgery, chemotherapy and radiation.
These interventions might or might not prove effective for recovery or comfort.
Ohio's decisionally capacitated cancer patients may accept or refuse them. But
Ohio's decisionally incapacitated cancer patients who have written durable
powers of attorney for health care lose their rights to refuse these treatments
through their appointed surrogates until they enter into either a "terminal
condition" or "permanently unconscious state." Even refusals expressed while
they were decisionally capacitated cannot be effectively represented by the
surrogate until judgments of "terminal condition" or "permanently unconscious
state" are made on the medical records.
Ohio's cardiac, stroke and other seriously ill patients regrettably are
similarly situated. They might want to refuse invasive, aggressive cardiac or
neurological medical treatments. They might want to refuse placement in a
nursing home. Indeed, they might have clearly, consistently expressed these
refusals. But if they execute a durable power of attorney for health care and then
lose decisional capacity, respect for their refusals as represented by their
appointed surrogates must itself be refused, and the host of available lifesustaining treatments imposed, until they are judged "terminal" or "permanently
unconscious."

restrictions are unnecessary, however, in a health care proxy law, where citizens who want restrictions can
include them in the document.
36

OOREV. (XDE ANN.§ 13f".13(B) (Anderson 1991).
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Ohio's citizens deserve revisions of the durable power of attorney for health
care law that enable them to retain common-law rights by controlling their
attorney-in-fact's scope of authority upon their own decisional incapacity. Our
current durable power law, therefore, should be amended to facilitate surrogate
decisionmaking whenever a patient designates a health care attorney-in-fact to
act. This amendment would allow Ohio citizens a real choice to write a health
care proxy or a living will advance directive. Those who wish to express only
their wishes about life-sustaining medical treatments near death can execute an
Ohio living will. Those who choose to grant any decisionmaking authority to an
appointed surrogate for all or a limited number of medical choices upon
incapacity can use an Ohio durable power of attorney for health care.
Thus, we believe that a better alternative to Ohio's current restrictive
provisions would preserve a wider range of choice across an immense variety of
individuated wishes and circumstances, by enabling Ohio's citizens to write
durable powers of attorney for health care in which they, but not the state, may
limit the authority of the designated attorney-in-fact. Our current durable power
of attorney for health care law should be amended to conform with the health
37
care proxy laws of other jurisdictions.
B.

Living Wills
1.

The Definition of "Terminal Condition"

Unlike health care powers of attorney, living wills law address to a narrow
circumstance: decisions about life-sustaining treatment when a patient is
decisionally incapacitated and his or her condition is irreversible and incurable.
Living wills express this limited effect by becoming operative when such a
patient's condition is judged "terminal." We agree with this restriction of
"terminal condition" as a prerequisite to complying with a living will. Ohio's
current definition of "terminal condition," however, is the most restrictive such
provision found in any state law, because our definition says that a patient's
condition must be "untreatable" as well as "irreversible and incurable" to be
judged "terminal."
Use of the word "untreatable" in this context is multiply problematic.
Consider just two objections. First, "untreatable" echoes the ethically discredited
"technological imperative" that available medical treatments must be started and
continued regardless of the patient's condition, prognosis, wishes, interests and
values simply because they are available. Second, "untreatable" creates an
excessive restriction on Ohio's citizens and physicians because it is never

37 See proposed

§§

1337.1.11, .13, .15, .16, and .17 infra Appendix A.
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clinically, ethically or legally necessary to implement all available treatments and
see them fail in order to diagnose a "terminal condition."
Most of the states which define "terminal condition" in their advance
directive laws38 include Ohio's "irreversible and incurable" phrase but none add
"untreatable."
Ohio's current definition's inclusion of "untreatable" is
misguided and excessively restrictive, because irreversible and incurable
conditions remain "treatable," yet the intention of citizens who execute living
wills is to forego unhelpful and burdensome medical treatments. The word
"untreatable" therefore should be deleted from the definition of "terminal
condition" in the MURTIA law, 39 bringing this definition into conformity with
41
URTIA 40 and the statutes in at least twenty other states.
2. Artificial Hydration and Nutrition
Additional provisions in Ohio's living will law mandate a probate court
hearing before removing Artificial Hydration and Nutrition (AHN) from
permanently unconscious patients who have executed valid Ohio living wills but
have not checked and initialed a capitalized statement on their documents. 42 The
law also requires a probate court hearing for permanently unconscious patients
from other states who have not written documents or who executed documents
which do not include these statements. 43 For reasons discussed in the next
section, we believe these restrictions are also unreasonable and unnecessary and
should be repealed.

38

Id. See, e.g. COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-18-103(10) (1989); D.C. CODE ANN. § 6-2421(6) (1989); ILL

REV.STAT. Ch. 755, § 3512(h)(Smith-Hurd 1992); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.58.2(10) (West 1992);
MINN. STAT. § 145B.02(8) (West Supp. 1993); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 137-H:2(VI) (1990); OR. REV. STAT.

§ 127.605(6) (1990); UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2-1103(7) (1993); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 5252(5) (1987);
WIS. STAT. § 154.01(8) (West 1989). See also infra note 41.
39 §2133.01(AA)(Anderson Supp. 1992)..
40 See, e.g., URTIA, supra note 3, § 1(9) which defines "terminal condition" as: "an incurable and irreversible
condition that, without the administration of life-sustaining treatment, will, in the opinion of the attending
physician, result in death within a relatively short time."
41 See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 18.12.100(7) (1991); ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-17-201(9) (Michie 1991); CAL.

HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 71860) (Deering 1991); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-18-104(10)(1989);
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19a-570(3) (West 1991); HAW. REV. STAT. § 327D-2 (Supp. 1992); IOWA CODE §
144A.2(8) (West Supp. 1993); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 311.624(8) (Baldwin 1991); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.
18-A, § 5-701(b) (West Supp. 1992); MINN. STAT. § 145B.02 (1991); MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-9-102(14)
(1992); MO. REV. STAT. § 459.0101(6)(1985); NEB.REV. STAT. § 20-403(11) (1992); NEV. REV. STAT. §
449.590 (Michie 1991); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:2H-55 (1992); N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-06.4-02(7) (1991);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. §3101.3 (12)(1992); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-4.11-2(h) (Supp. 1992); S.C. CODE ANN. § 4477-20 (4)(1993); S. D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 34-12D1(8) (1991); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §
672.002(9) (West 1992); WASH. REV. CODE § 70.122.020(9) (West 1993); W.VA. CODE § 16-30-2(10) (Supp.
1992).

42 § 2133.15(B).
43 § 2133.15(B).

This makes § 2133.15(A) consistent with current § 2133.14 which recognizes the validity of
another state's
advanced directive.
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Non-DeclarantProvisions
1.

Permanently Unconscious Patients

Current Ohio law mandates a 12-month period of providing all possible
life-sustaining treatments for patients in a PUS who have not executed an
advance directive. 44 It also requires a probate court order before removing
artificial hydration and nutrition (AHN) from the same patients. 45 Similar
limitations apply to permanently unconscious patients who have an otherwise
valid living will but have not checked or included this statement in their
document. 46
These requirements typify Ohio's singular approach to advance directives.
First, no other state burdens and restricts visitors from other states by imposing
47
idiosyncratic requirements for which these visitors cannot have planned.
Second, for Ohio's patients and surrogates, the mandatory 12-month requirement
that all life-sustaining treatment be provided is equally burdensome, unnecessary
and restrictive.
PUS is a progressive 48 and irreversible condition for which life-sustaining
treatments including AHN offer neither recovery nor comfort. We say so
because PUS as defined in Ohio law requires a finding of a serious and
irreversible condition in which "(1) the patient is irreversibly unaware of self and
environment, and (2) there is a total loss of cerebral cortical functioning,
resulting in the patient's having no capacity to experience pain and suffering." 49
44

OHIOREV. CODE ANN. §§ 2133.08(A)(IXa),(2), 2133.09 (Anderson 1991).

45 § 2133.09.
46 See notes 43-44 and accompanying text, supra.
47 Many statutes follow the lead of URTIA, including permanent unconscious states in their statutory
definitions of terminal condition. See URTIA supra note 3, § 1; ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-3201(6)
(1986)(amended 1992); FLA. STAT. 765.101(17) (West Supp. 1993); IDAHO CODE § 39-4503(3)
(1985)(amended 1988); IOWA CODE § 144A.2.8 (West Supp. 1993); TENN. CODE ANN. § 32-11-103(8)
(1992). Others, like Ohio, separately define PUS. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1337.1 1(T), 2133.01. Once
defined, however, all states except Ohio treat PUS and terminal condition identically. See e.g., ARK. CODE
ANN. § 20-17-201(11) (Michie 1991); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7186(c) (Deering 1991); CONN. GEN.
STAT. § 19a-570(3) (West 1991); GA. CODE ANN. § 31-32-2(9) (Michie 1992); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18A, § 5-701(b) (10)(West Supp. 1992); NEB. REV. STAT. § 20-403(6) (1992); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 137H:2(VII) (1990); N.J. REV. STAT. § 26:2H-55 (West Supp. 1993); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-321(a)(4) (Supp.
1992); 20 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5403 (Supp. 1993); S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-5-504(7) (Law. Co-op. 1992); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 34-12D-1(8) (Supp. 1993); VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2982 (Michie 1992); WASH.
REV. CODE § 70.122.020(6) (West Supp. 1993); W.VA. CODE § 16-30-2(10) (Supp. 1992); WYO. STAT. § 3522-101 (Supp. 1992).
48 Patients in a PUS continue to deteriorate physically.. Their muscles lose tone, their bones become more
brittle and skin breaks down causing bed sores. Any remaining brain tissue deteriorates. Death eventually
occurs from infection brought on by this continuing physical deterioration and increasing immunity to
antibiotics. In re Guardianship of Myers, Case No. 692-12-049 (Summit County Probate Court Jan. 29, 1993),
See also Persistent Vegetative State and the Decision to Withdraw or Withhold Life Support, 263 JAMA 426
(Jan. 19, 1990).
49 §§ 1337.11"(T); 2133.01(U).
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Typical life-sustaining treatments used to prolong a PUS include surgery,
placement in intensive care, cardio-pulmonary resuscitation, intubation and
ventilation, drug therapies, dialysis, blood transfusions, intravenous fluids,
enteral feedings or hyperalimentation. Under current laws, Ohio's physicians
must provide all of these life-sustaining treatments to patients without advance
directives for at least one year following the diagnosis of permanent
unconsciousness. 50 Only then is a patient's surrogate empowered to consent to the
withdrawing of life-sustaining treatment. Further, if the surrogate decides that
the patient would want AHN withdrawn, that person must petition the probate
court to withdraw this life sustaining measure."'
The American Academy of Neurology and the American Medical
52
Association have recently issued position papers about care of patients in PUS.
Both organizations say that once diagnosed, PUS is an irreversible and
progressive condition for which available medical technologies only prolong the
unconscious and deteriorating status quo. They say medical treatments
53
legitimately can be withheld and withdrawn.
These organizations additionally indicate that permanent unconsciousness
takes three to six months to diagnose. An Ohio family who receives this bad
news must wait the required year beyond the date of diagnosis. Implementation
of Ohio's rules will therefore often require more than a year and a half of invasive
medical care. This imposes significant burdens on irreversibly ill patients, their
caregivers, and also on their surrogates who often know the patient's wishes,
interests and values and know that the patient would not wish any of a vast array
of life-sustaining treatments in these circumstances. 4
The 12-month and filing provisions thus are excessively restrictive. In all
other states, appropriate surrogates can decide, or can seek judicial review of care
50 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2133.08(AX1)(a) (Anderson 1991).
51 48 § 2133.09.
52 Executive Board of the American Academy of Neurology, Position of the Anerican Academy of Neurology
on Certain Aspects of the Care and Maintenanceof the Persistent Vegetative State Patient,39 Neurology 125
(1989)[hereinafter Amercian Academy of Neurology]; Council on Scientific Affairs and Council on Ethical
and Judicial Affairs, American Academy of Medicine, Persistent Vegetative State and the Decision to Withdraw
or Withhold Life Support, 263 JAMA 426 (1990){ hereinafter American Medical Association]..
53 American Academy of Neurology, supra note 52, at 126; American Medical Association, supra note 52, at
429.
54 Recognizing this burden to the patient, the vast majority of cases hold that artificial life supports, including
AHN, can be withdrawn from a patient in a persistent vegetative state. See, e.g., In re guardianship of Myers,
610 N.E.2d 663 (Summit County P. Ct., Ohio 1993); Guardianship of Doe, 583 N.E.2d 1263 (Mass. 1992) cert.
denied, 112 S. Ct. 1512 (1992); Rosebush v. Oakland County Prosecutor (In re Rosebush), 491 N.W.2d 633
(Mich. Ct. App. 1992); Lenz v. L.E. Phillips Career Dev. Cir. (In re Guardianship of L.W), 482 N.W.2d 60
(Wis. 1992), In re Guardianship of Mclnnis, 548 N.E.2d 1389 (Stark County P. Ct. 1991); In re Guardianship of
Crum, 580 N.E.2d 876 (Franklin County P. CL 1991); (In re Guardianship of Browning), 568 So. 2d 4 (Fla.
1990); In re Estate of Greenspan, 558 NE. 2d 1194 (D1. 1990). For cases decided before Cruzan. see Susan R.
Martyn & Henry J. Bourguignon, Coming to Terms with Death. The Cruzan Case, 42 HASTINGS L.J. 817, 828
n.59 (1991).
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decisions for patients in a PUS once it is diagnosed. Only in Ohio, must
surrogates accept excessive and heroic medical care for a minimum of 12 months
before being heard.55
2.

Written Consent

Ohio law requires a written, witnessed consent for withholding and
withdrawing life-sustaining interventions from nondeclarant patients who are
incapacitated and in a terminal condition or PUS. 5 6 This requirement is
burdensome to families who often ask why, after they have given informed
consent to forego medical treatments, they should have to review the situation all
over again and sign a form. Furthermore, this requirement exceeds Ohio's
current legal standard of informed consent. For all other medical decisionmaking
in Ohio, oral informed consent from the patient or surrogate is legally
sufficient. 57 Once again, Ohio is one of only a few states that require written,
witnessed consent in these situations.58
3.

Decisionmaking Standards

The current DPAHC law includes both "substituted judgment" and "best
interests" as standards of surrogate decisionmaking. 59 We recommend that the
best interests standard be added to the substituted judgment standard for
surrogate decisionmaking on behalf of non-declarants.
The substituted judgment standard permits surrogate decisionmaking for
non-declarants based on the previously expressed, known or inferred wishes,

55

Because § 2133.08 and .09 completely deny a patient the right to be heard through an appropriate surrogate,
it probably poses constitutional problems. See Cruzan v. Director Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 289-90
(1990) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
56
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2133.08(A) (Anderson 1991).

57

See § 2317.54(C) [written consent is presumed valid but that oral consent is sufficient if recognized by
common law]. Ohio's Supreme Court has recognized such a common law right. See Nickell v. Gonzalez, 477
N.E. 2d 1145, 1148 (Ohio 1985).
58 Although a few states require a writing, see, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-17-214 (Michie 1991); IOWA
CODE ANN. § 144A.7 (West 1989); MASS. GEN. LAWS. ANN. ch. 201D, § 16 (West Supp. 1993); TEX.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 672.009 (West 1991); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 75-2-1105, 75-2-1107 (1993);
most states require "consent" without specifying its form. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-18.5.103(3),
(4) (Supp. 1992); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19a-571 (West Supp. 1993); D.C. CODE ANN. § 21-2210 (1989 &
Supp. 1992); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 765.401 (West Supp. 1993); GA. CODE ANN. § 31-9-2 (Michie 1991); HAW.
REV. STAT. § 327D-21 (Supp. 1992); ILL. ANN.. STAT. Ch. 755, § 40/25 (Smith-Hurd 1992); IND. CODE ANN.
§ 16-8-12-4 (West 1992); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 40:1299.53,40:1299.58.5 (West 1992); ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 18-A, § 5-707 (West Supp. 1992); MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. § 20-107(d) (1991); MONT.
CODE ANN. § 50-9-106(1991); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 449.626 (Michie 1991); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-7-8.1
(Michie 1991); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-322 (Supp. 1992); OR. REV. STAT. § 127.635(2) (1990); S.C. CODE
ANN. § 44-66-30 (Law Co-Op 1990); VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2986 (Michie 1992); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §
7.70.065 (West 1992); WYO. STAT. §§ 3-5-209, 35-22-105 (Supp. 1992).
59 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 6 1337.13(AXI) (Anderson 1991).
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interests and values of the patient. 60 Substituted judgment is the preferred legal
standard for surrogate decisionmaking when there is no advance directive;
however, it is not readily applicable in cases in which the patient's wishes,
interests and values are not known. We can attest from experience that many
patients and their surrogates "never talked about it", and many other patients are
without close surrogates. These cases require use of the best interests standard
for surrogate decisionmaking.
"Best interests" means that the appropriate legal surrogate, fully informed of
the facts of the case -- e.g., the patient's condition and prognosis, and the benefits
and harms of utilizing or forgoing available medical treatments for the patient -makes a decision based on what is in the best interest of the patient. We note that
the best interests standard is an established legal standard for a wide range of
parents
decisionmaking, and that, in Ohio, surrogates such as guardians and
61
legally must make best interests decisions for their wards and children.
CONCLUSION
We have attempted on the foregoing pages to capsulize our work during the
past year and to provide the reader with an understanding of the reasoning behind
these proposals. We feel that the need is critical and the time is at hand to
implement revisions that focus on the goal of patient centered advance directive
laws for Ohio. While the enactment of the Ohio DPAHC and MURTIA laws
was a major step in the right direction, practical experience in dealing with the
laws as enacted has shown that they require qualification, focus and consistency
of purpose. It is the hope of this Task Force that the revisions we have suggested
will lay the groundwork for that redrafting.

60

See, e.g., In Re Milton, 505 N.E.2d 255 (Ohio 1987), cert. denied. 484 U.S. 820 (1987).
61 See, e.g.. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2111.50(C) (Anderson 1991); In re Guardianship of Myers, Case No.
692-12-049 (Summit County P. Ct. 1993).
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Appendix A
[DURABLE POWER FOR HEALTH CARE]
Section
1337.11
1337.12
1337.13
1337.14
1337.15
1337.16

1337.17

Definitions.
Durable power of attorney for health care; witnesses acknowledge.
Authority of attorney in fact.
Revocation of power.
Immunity of physicians and other persons.
Health care benefits not to be affected; refused to follow instructions;
transfer to willing physician or facility; emergencies; notification of
certain persons; complaint by objecting person; power executed in
another state.
Use of printed form; notice to principal.

1337.11 Definitions.
As used in sections 1337.11 to 1337.17 of the Revised Code:
(A) "Adult" means a person who is eighteen years of age or older.
(B) "Attending physician" means the physician to whom a principal or his
family has assigned primary responsibility for the treatment or care of the
principal or, if the principal or his family has not assigned that responsibility, the
physician who has accepted that responsibility.
(C) "Comfort care" means any of the fellowing:
(1) Nutrition when administered to diminish the pain or discomfort of
principal, not to postpene his death;
(2) Hydration when administeroed to dimfintish the pain or disceforet of
principal, noet to postpone his death;
(3
Aany ethe medical or nursing procedure, treatment, intervention, or
other measure that is taken to diminish the pain or discomfort of a principal, not
to postpone his death.
(D) "Consulting physician" means a physician who, in conjunction with the
attending physician of a principal, makes one or more determinations that are
required to be made by the attending physician, or to be made by the attending
physician and one other physician, by an applicable provision of sections
1337.11 to 1337.17 of the Revised Code, to a reasonable degree of medical
certainty and in accordance with reasonable medical standards.
(E) "Guardian" means a person appointed by a probate court pursuant to
Chapter 2111. of the Revised Code to have the care and management of the
person of an incompetent.
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(F) "Health care" means any care, treatment, service, or procedure to
maintain, diagnose, or treat an individual's physical or mental condition.
(G) "Health care decision" means informed consent, refusal to give
informed consent, or withdrawal of informed consent to health care.
(H) "Health care facility" means any of the following:
(1) A hospital;
(2) A hospice care program or other institution that specializes in comfort
care of patients in a termi.nl c
.nditiont
or in a permanently
.
uncnsi. us state;
(3) A nursing home;
(4) A home health agency;
(5) An intermediate care facility for the mentally retarded.
(I) "Health care personnel" means physicians, nurses, physician's assistants,
emergency medical technicians-ambulance, advanced emergency medical
technicians-ambulance, emergency medical technicians-paramedic, medical
technicians, dietitians, other authorized persons acting under the direction of an
attending physician, and administrators of health care facilities.
(J) "Home health agency" has the same meaning as in section 3701.88 of
the Revised Code.
(K) "Hospice care program" has the same meaning as in section 3712.01 of
the Revised Code.
(L) "Hospital" has the same meanings as in sections 2108.01, 3701.01, and
5122.01 of the Revised Code.
(M) "Hydration" mneans fluids that are artifieially or teehnoelogically
dminiistered
(N) (M) *"Incompetent" has the same meaning as in section 2111.01 of the
Revised Code.
( (N) "Intermediate care facility for the mentally retarded" has the same
meaning as in section 5111.20 of the Revised Code.
(P) "Life sustaining treatment" mfan an
eal procedure, treatmaent,
intervention, or other measure that, whten adiitrdto
a principal, will sefve
princeipally to prolonig the proels of dig
( (0) "Medical claim" has the same meaning as in section 2305.11 of the
Revised Code.
(R) (P) "Nursing home" has the same meaning as in section 3721.01 of the
Revised Code.
(S) "Nutrition" mneans sustenance that is artificially or teehnologieally
adfaiistered.
(T) "Permanently ucniosstate"
maeans a state of permantent
unconciousess int a princeipal that, to a reasonable degree of mnedical certainty is
determinted int aecordance with reasontable mtedical standards by the princeipal's
attending physieian and one other physician who has examined the princeipal, is
characterized by both of the following:
S(1) Theprincipal is irreersibly unwr fhimself and his environent.
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(2) There is a total less of erebral cortical functioning, resulting in te
r
principal having no capacity to experinc pai TSuffering.
(UM (Q) "Person" has the same meaning as in section 1.59 of the Revised
Code and additionally includes political subdivisions and governmental agencies,
boards, commissions, departments, institutions, offices, and other
instrumentalities.
MV) (R) "Physician" means a person who is licensed under Chapter 4731. of
the Revised Code to practice medicine or surgery or osteopathic medicine and
surgery, or a person who otherwise is authorized to practice medicine or surgery
or osteopathic medicine and surgery in this state.
(W) (S) "Political subdivision" and "state" have the same meanings as in
section 2744.01 of the Revised Code.
(X) (T) "Professional disciplinary action" means action taken by the board
or other entity that regulates the professional conduct of health care personnel,
including the state medical board and the board of nursing.
(Y-) "Terminal condition" men anireversible, AND incurfable, and
Fnufom which, to
untreatable conditiont caused by disease, illness, or
d in acc.r.dane w
reasonable degree of mnedial certainty as deteie....
reasonable mnedical standards by a princeipal's attending physician, and one other
physician who has examined the principal, both of the following apply:
(1) There can benorcer.
(2) Death is likely toocrthint a relatively short timne if life sustmingff
treatment is notadistrd
-- (Z) (U) "Tort action" means a civil action for damages for injury, death, or
loss to person or property, other than a civil action for damages for a breach of
contract or another agreement between persons.

1337.12 Durable power of attorney for health care; witnesses;
acknowledgment.
(A)(1) An adult who is of sound mind voluntarily may create a valid
durable power of attorney for health care by executing a durable power of
attorney, in accordance with division (B) of section 1337.09 of the Revised
Code, that authorizes an attorney in fact as described in division (A)(2) of this
section to make health care decisions for the principal at any time that the
attending physician of the principal determines that he has lost the capacity to
make informed health care decisions for himself. Except as otherwise provided
in divisions (B) to (F) of section 1337.13 of the Revised Code, the authorization
may include the right to give informed consent, to refuse to give informed
consent, or to withdraw informed consent, to any health care that is being or
could be provided to the principal. Additionally, to be valid, a durable power of
attorney for health care shall satisfy both of the following:
(a) It shall be signed by the principal and state the date of its execution.
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol26/iss2/5
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(b) It shall be witnessed in accordance with division (B) of this section or

be acknowledged by the principal in accordance with division (C) of this section.
(2) Except as otherwise provided in this division, a durable power of
attorney for health care may designate any competent adult as the attorney in
fact. The attending physician of the principal and an administrator of any nursing
home in which the principal is receiving care shall not be designated as in
attorney in fact in, or act as an attorney in fact pursuant to, a durable power of
attorney for health care. An employee or agent of the attending physician of the
principal and an employee or agent of any health care facility in which the
principal is being treated shall not be designated as an attorney in fact in, or act
as an attorney in fact pursuant to, a durable power of attorney for health care,
except that these limitations do not preclude a principal from designating either
type of employee or agent as his attorney in fact if the individual is a competent
adult and related to the principal by blood, marriage, or adoption, or if the
individual is a competent adult and the principal and the individual are members
of the same religious order.
(3) A durable power of attorney for health care shall not expire, unless the
principal specifies an expiration date in the instrument. However, when a
durable power of attorney contains an expiration date, if the principal lacks the
capacity to make informed health care decisions for himself on the expiration
date, the instrument shall continue in effect until the principal regains the
capacity to make informed health care decisions for himself.
(B) If witnessed for purposes of division (A)(1)(b) of this section, a durable
power of attorney for health care shall be witnessed by at least two individuals
who are adults and who are not ineligible to be witnesses under this division.
Any person who is related to the principal by blood, marriage, or adoption, any
person who is designated as the attorney in fact in the instrument, the attending
physician of the principal, and the administrator of any nursing home in which
the principal is receiving care are ineligible to be witnesses.
The witnessing of a durable power of attorney for health care shall involve
the principal signing, or acknowledging his signature on, the instrument in the
presence of each witness. Then, each witness shall subscribe his signature on the
durable power of attorney for health care and, by doing so, attest to his belief that
the principal appears to be of sound mind and not under or subject to duress,
fraud, or undue influence.
(C) If acknowledged for purposes of division (A)(1)(b) of this section, a
durable power of attorney for health care shall be acknowledged before a notary
public, who shall make the certification described in section 147.53 of the
Revised Code and also shall attest that the principal appears to be of sound mind
and not under or subject to duress, fraud, or undue influence.
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1337.13 Authority of attorney in fact.
(A)(1) An attorney in fact under a durable power of attorney for health care
shall make health care decisions for the principal only if the instrument
substantially complies with section 1337.12 of the Revised Code and specifically
authorizes the attorney in fact to make health care decisions for the principal, and
only if the attending physician of the principal determines that he has lost the
capacity to make informed health care decisions for himself. Except as otherwise
provided in divisions (B) to (F) (D) of this section and subject to any specific
limitations in the instrument, the attorney in fact may make health care decisions
for the principal to the same extent as the principal could make those decisions
for himself if he had the capacity to do so. Except as otherwise provided in
divisions (B) to (F) of this section, in exercising his authority, the attorney in fact
shall act consistently with the desires of the principal or, if the desires of the
principal are unknown, shall act in the best interest of the principal.
(2) This section does not affect, and shall not be construed as affecting, any
right that the person designated as attorney in fact in a durable power of attorney
for health care may have, apart from the instrument, to make or participate in the
making of health care decisions on behalf of the principal.
(3) Unless the right is limited in a durable power of attorney for health care,
when acting pursuant to the instrument, the attorney in fact has the same right as
the principal to receive information about proposed health care, to review health
care records, and to consent to the disclosure of health care records.
(B)( 1) An attorney in faet under!a durable power of attorney for! healt ear
does not have authority, ont behalf of the principal, to refuse or! withdraw
irnformed consent to life sustaining treatmeat, unless the princeipal is in a terminal
emantently unconscious state and unless the applicable
eendition ori
requremets o divsions (B)(2) and (3) of this sectiont are satisfied.
(2.) in order! fora tonyi faet to refuse or! withdraw iffrmed consent
te life suistaining treatment for a principal who i in a eanently uncoscou
state, the consulting physician associated with the determination that the
prineipal is int the permanently unconscious state shall be a physician who, by
viftue of advanced education or training, of a practice limited to par-ieula
diseases, illnesses, injutries, therapies, or braches of mnedicine and surgery 1
osteopathic mnedicfie and surgery, of certificationt as a specialist int a panitt!la
branch of mcedicine or surgery or osteopathic mnedicine and surgery, or of
osteopathic
- .erine acquired in the practice of medicine and surgery or
.me-diceine and sur~gery, is qualified to determine whether the princeipalisn
permanently unconsciouis stae.
(3) in order frt an attorney in fact to refuse or withdraw informfed consent
to life sustaifting treatfaeat for a princeipal who is in a terminal conditionoenv
permnanently uncoenscious state, the attending physician of the princeipal shall
determinte, int good faith, to a reasonable degree of mnedical certainty, and in~
accordance with reasontable mnedical standards, that thersn reoable
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possibilty that the pannipa will regain the eapacity to make iftonnefm
-heal~t
cure decisions for himselfi.
(-) (B) Except as otherwise provided in this division, an attorney in fact
under a durable power of attorney for health care does not have authority, on
behalf of the principal, to refuse or withdraw informed consent to health care
necessary to provide comfort care. This division does not pre.lude, and shall not
as precluding, an attorney in fat under a durable power of attore
(nstned
be e
t
tocnsent
the previsi
withdrawing informed
a riy
oe ortefusing
av
far heat
nudtin or hydratien to the principal if, under the circmstances desribed in
division (E) of this section, the attorney in fact would not bc proehibited fram
refusing or withdrawintg informned consent to the proevisiont of nutrition of
hydration to the prineipal.
"D (C) An attorney in fact under a durable power of attorney for health
care does not have authority to refuse or withdraw informed consent to health
care for a principal who is pregnant if the refusal or withdrawal of the health care
would terminate the pregnancy, unless the pregnancy or the health care would
pose a substantial risk to the life of the principal, or unless the principal's
attending physician and at least one other physician who has examined the
principal determine, to a reasonable degree of medical certainty and in
accordance with reasonable medical standards, that the fetus would not be born
alive.
(E) An attorney in fact under a durable power of attorney for health care
does noet have authority to refuse or withdraw informed consent to the provision
of nutrition or hydration to the priincipal, unless the princeipal is in a temiwAl
tly uncoenscious state and unless the following apply:
condition or!in a ema
(1) The principal's attending physician and at least one other physician who
has examined the principalI detennine, to a reasonable degree of medical certainfty
and in accordance with reasonable fnedical standards, that nutrition or hydraion
will not or no longer will serve to provide comfo t to, or alleviate pain of, th.
(-2) if the prineipal is in a permanently unconscious state, the principal ha
authorized the attorney int fact to refuse or withdraw informed consent to h
proevision of nutrition or: hydration to him when he is in a pefmanently
en,v,,.
or ome mar
+..,,.,
.uvs...
+,IZ.+.I
a inof the following in
a) the
oi miSCeGuon
durable power of attorney
uncnscousstate
by OOe,+L.
doing
both
for healt care:L
letters that the attorney int fact may
(a) Inceluding a statemn icAa
refuse or withdraw iforemed cnentt the provisiont of nutfition or hydfationt to
ioutate and if the determination
the principal if he is int a permanently unos
described in divisiont (E)(1) of this section is maade, or eheedng or etherwise
marking a box or line that is adjacent to a simfilar staement oft a printed formf of n
durable power of attorney for health cure;
(b) Placing his initials orsgatr nderneath or adjacent to the statemaent,
etee,
r vute.., fatfklt desene
- H. ;AV;QIAfj kiP-)k4.)ka) ()f tfjjS Seefteft.

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1993

21

Akron Law Review, Vol. 26 [1993], Iss. 2, Art. 5

AKRON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 26: 2

rincipal is in a permnanent ly unconsciouts state, his -attendin
physieian detefmines, int good faith, that the principal authorized the attonyn
faet te refuse or withdraw iffemed consent to the proevision of nutritiont e
hydration to him when he is in a permaftently flfleU5state by comnplyinfg
with the reurmnsof divisions (E)(2)(a) and (b) of this sectiont.
(F) (D) An attorney in fact under a durable power of attorney for health care
does not have authority to withdraw informed consent to any health care to which
the principal previously consented, unless at least one of the following applies:
(1) A change in the physical condition of the principal has significantly
decreased the benefit of that health care to the principal.
(2) The health care is not, or is no longer, significantly effective in
achieving the purposes for which the principal consented to its use.
Ull

1337.14 Revocation of power.
(A) A principal who creates a valid durable power of attorney for health
care may revoke that instrument or the designation of the attorney in fact under
it. The principal may so revoke at any time and in any manner. The revocation
shall be effective when the principal expresses his intention to so revoke, except
that, if the principal made his attending physician aware of the durable power of
attorney for health care, the revocation shall be effective upon its communication
to the attending physician by the principal himself, a witness to the revocation, or
other health care personnel to whom the revocation is communicated by such a
witness. Absent actual knowledge to the contrary, the attending physician of the
principal and other health care personnel who are informed of the revocation of a
durable power of attorney for health care by an alleged witness may rely on the
information and act in accordance with the revocation.
(B) Upon the communication as described in division (A) of this section to
the attending physician of a principal of the fact that his durable power of
attorney for health care has been revoked, the attending physician or other health
care personnel acting under the direction of the attending physician shall make
the fact a part of the principal's medical record.
(C) Unless the instrument provides otherwise, a valid durable power of
attorney for health care revokes a prior, valid durable power of attorney for
health care.

1337.15 Immunity of physicians and other persons.
(A) Subject to division (14) (G) of this section, an attending physician of a
principal is not subject to criminal prosecution or professional disciplinary
action, and is not liable in damages in a tort or other civil action for actions taken
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in good faith and in reliance on a health care decision when all of the following
are satisfied:
(1) The decision is made by an attorney in fact under a durable power of
attorney for health care after he receives information sufficient to satisfy the
requirements of informed consent or refusal or withdrawal of informed consent,
and the attending physician, in good faith, believes that the attorney in fact is
authorized to make the decision.
(2) The attending physician, in good faith, believes that the decision is
consistent with the desires of the principal, or the attorney in fact informs the
attending physician that the desires of the principal are unknown and the
attending physician, in good faith, believes that the desires of the principal are
unknown and that the decision is in the best interest of the principal.
(3) The attending physician determines, in good faith, to a reasonable
degree of medical certainty, and in accordance with reasonable medical
standards, that the principal has lost the capacity to make informed health care
decisions for himself.
(4) if the decision is to withhold or withdraw life sustaining treatment, tThe
attending physician attempts, in good faith, to determine the desires of the
principal to the extent that the principal is able to convey them and places a
report of the attempt in the health care records of the principal.
(5)If the decision is to withheld r-rwithdraw life sustaling treatment, the
attending physician dete~n in god faith, to a reasonable degree of mnedieal
ertainty, and in aecorda e with re--Rsenable mnedical standards, that both of the
fellewiflg appl)e.
(a) The prineipal is in a terminal condition er in a permanently uncoensciouts
state.
(b) Ther inoraonable possibility that the principal will regain th
eapacity to mnake informned health cafe decisions for himself
(6) (5) If the decision pertains to a principal who is pregnant and if the
withholding or withdrawal of health care would terminate the pregnancy, the
attending physician makes, in good faith, to a reasonable degree of medical
certainty, and in accordance with reasonable medical standards, a determination
whether or not the pregnancy or health care involved would pose a substantial
risk to the life of the principal, or a determination whether or not the fetus would
be born alive.
(7) if the decisien pertains to the proevisiont of ntutritiont or hydrationt to a
princeipal who is in a terminal conditiont or int a permanently unconscious state,
the attending physician determines, in good faith, to a reasontable degree ot
mnedical certainty, and int accordance with reasoniable mnedica standards, that
nutrition or hydration will not or no longer will serve to previde coforft to, 0
alleviate pain of, the princeipal.
(8) if the decisiont pertans to the provision of nutrition or hydraion to a
pfincipal who is int a permanently unonciu state, the attending physician
determines, in good faith, that the principal authorized the atorney in fact-to
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refuse or withdraw infomed onsent to the provisionf of nutition or hydrtion to
by complying with h
him when he is int a permanently ncncusstate
rq ireets of divisionts (E)(2)(a) Emd (b) of section 1337.13 of the Revie
(B) Notwithstading the health care decisiont of the attorney in feet, subjet
to division (H4) of this sectiont, an attending physician of a principal is net subject
te criminal presecution or proefessional disciplintary actiont, and is noet liable in
damfages int a tort or other civil actiont for providing or for fitiling to withdraw
life sustaining treatment.
(C) (B) Subject to division (4) (G) of this section, a consulting physician is
not subject to criminal prosecution or professional disciplinary action, and is not
liable in damages in a tort or other civil action as follows:
(1) If the health care decision involved is one other thant the health care
decision described in division (G)(2), (3), or (4) of this section,the consulting
physician made a determination, in good faith, to a reasonable degree of medical
certainty, and in accordance with reasonable medical standards, in conjunction
with the attending physician of a principal.
(2) if the deision is to withhold or withdraw life sustaining treatment, the
nesinginod Faith, to a reasonable degree of medical
ensulting physician det
medical stadards, after ex
o
lcertainty, and in accordance with reasonable
the printipal, that the prineipal is in a termi
condtion
nal
or ineermanetly
fucsous state.
(3) (2) If the health care decision involved pertains to a principal who is
pregnant and if the withholding or withdrawal of health care would terminate the
pregnancy, the consulting physician makes, in good faith, to a reasonable degree
of medical certainty, and in accordance with reasonable medical standards, a
determination whether or not the pregnancy or health care involved would pose a
substantial risk to the life of the principal, or a determination whether or not the
fetus would be born alive.
to
(4) if the decisin pertains to the prevision of trition or hydrait
principal who is in a terminal condition or in a permanently unosiossae,
the consuilting physician determines, int good faith, to a reasonable degree of
mnedical ertainty, and int accordance with reasontable mnedical standards, that
ntrition or hydration will net or no longer will serve to provide coforft to, ci
alleviate pair. of, the pineipal.
(1D) (C) Subject to division "H (G) of this section, a person is not subject to
criminal prosecution or professional disciplinary action, and is not liable in
damages in a tort or other civil action for actions taken, in good faith, while
relying on a durable power of attorney for health care if the person does not have
actual knowledge of either of the following facts:
(1) The durable power of attorney has been revoked pursuant to section
1337.14 of the Revised Code.
(2) The durable power of attorney does not substantially comply with
sections 1337.11 to 1337.17 of the Revised Code.
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(E) (D) Subject to division (14) (G) of this section, a consulting physician,
an employee or agent of any health care facility or the attending physician of a
principal, and health care personnel acting under the direction of the attending
physician of a principal are not subject to criminal prosecution or professional
disciplinary action, and are not liable in damages in a tort or other civil action for
any action described in division (A), (B), (C), or (D) of this section that was
undertaken, in good faith, pursuant to the direction of the attending physician of
the principal.
(F) (E) Subject to division ("4) (G) of this section, a health care facility is
not subject to criminal prosecution or professional disciplinary action, and is not
liable in damages in a tort or other civil action for any action that properly was
undertaken pursuant to division (A), (B), (C), (D), or (E) of this section.
(C) (F) Subject to division (14) (G) of this section, an attorney in fact is not
subject to criminal prosecution or professional disciplinary action, and is not
liable in damages in a tort or other civil action for health care decisions made in
good faith while acting pursuant to his authority under a durable power of
attorney for health care.
(H) (G) (1) Sections 1337.11 to 1337.17 of the Revised Code, and a durable
power of attorney for health care, do not affect or limit, and shall not be
construed as affecting or limiting, any potential tort or other civil liability of an
attending or consulting physician, an employee or agent of a health care facility
or an attending physician, health care personnel acting under the direction of an
attending physician, a health care facility, an attorney in fact, or any other person,
including, but not limited to, liability associated with a medical claim, that
satisfies both of the following:
(a) The liability arises but of a negligent action or omission in connection
with the medical diagnosis, care, or treatment of a principal under a durable
power of attorney for health care, or arises out of any deviation from reasonable
medical standards.
(b) The liability is based on the fact that the negligent action or omission, or
the deviation, as described in division (H)(G)(1)(a) of this section caused or
.ny
for health a
. of at
contributed to the principal under the darabl power
,minal
eenditi.n or bing in a.p.....ntly un nseiu state, of
having a t
..
to any injury to or the wrongful death of the
otherwise cau...sd or . ribute
principal.
(2) Sections 1337.11 to 1337.17 of the Revised Code, and a durable power
of attorney for health care, do not grant, and shall not be construed as granting,
an immunity from criminal or civil liability or from professional disciplinary
action to health care personnel for actions that are outside the scope of their
authority.
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1337.16 Health care benefits not to be affected; refusal to follow
instructions; transfer to willing physician or facility; emergencies;
notification of certain persons; complaint by objecting person; power
executed in another state.
(A) No physician, health care facility, other health care provider, person
authorized to engage in the business of insurance in this state under Title XXXIX
[39] of the Revised Code, medical care corporation, health care corporation,
health maintenance organization, other health care plan, or legal entity that is
self-insured and provides benefits to its employees or members shall require an
individual to create or refrain from creating a durable power of attorney for
health care, or shall require an individual to revoke or refrain from revoking a
durable power of attorney for health care, as a condition of being admitted to a
health care facility, being provided health care, being insured, or being the
recipient of benefits.
(B)(1) Subject to division (B)(2) of this section, an attending physician of a
principal or a health care facility in which a principal is confined may refuse to
comply or allow compliance with the instructions of an attorney in fact under a
durable power of attorney for health care on the basis of a matter of conscience or
on another basis. An employee or agent of an attending physician of a principal
or of a health care facility in which a principal is confined may refuse to comply
with the instructions of an attorney in fact under a durable power of attorney for
health care on the basis of a matter of conscience.
(2)(a) An attending physician of a principal who, or health care facility in
which a principal is confined that, is not willing or not able to comply or allow
compliance with the instructions of an attorney in fact under a durable power of
attorney for health care to use or continue, or to withhold or withdraw, health
care that were given under division (A) of section 1337.13 of the Revised Code,
or with any probate court reevalhatien order issued pursuant to division (E)(6) of
this section, SHALL TAKE REASONABLE STEPS AS PROMPTLY AS
PRACTICABLE TO TRANSFER CARE OF THE DECLARANT TO
ANOTHER PHYSICIAN OR HEALTH CARE FACILITY WHO IS WILLING
TO DO SO. shall not prevent or attempt to prevent, or ur.eas.nably delay e
attempt to uffeaseftably delay, the transfer of the princeipal to the eare of
physiciant who, or a health care facility that, is willing and able to so comfply, Or
(b) If the instruction of an attorney in fact under a durable power of
attorney for health care that is given under division (A) of section 1337.13 of the
Revised Code is to use or continue HEALTH CARE life stistaining-treatment in
eonnection with a principatl who is in a teminal conditionon
apeen*l
uncoscius state, then the attending physician of the principal who, or health
care facility in which the principal is confined that, is not willing or not able to
comply or allow compliance with that instruction shall use or continue the
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HEALTH CARE life sustaining t.atmen. or cause it to be used or continued
until a transfer as described in division (B)(2)(a) of this section is made.
(C) Sections 1337.11 to 1337.17 of the Revised Code, and a durable power
of attorney for health care created under section 1337.12 of the Revised Code, do
not affect or limit, and shall not be construed as affecting or limiting, the
authority of a physician or a health care facility to provide or not to provide
health care to a person in accordance with reasonable medical standards
applicable in an emergency situation.
(D) SECTIONS 1337.11 TO 1337.17 OF THE REVISED CODE, AND A
DURABLE POWER OF ATTORNEY FOR HEALTH CARE CREATED
UNDER SECTION 1337.12 OF THE REVISED CODE, DO NOT IMPAIR
AND SHALL NOT BE CONSTRUED AS IMPAIRING, THE AUTHORITY
OF A PHYSICIAN OR A HEALTH CARE FACILITY TO ISSUE A DO NOT
RESUSCITATE ORDER WHETHER OR NOT THE PATIENT HAS
EXECUTED A DURABLE POWER OF ATTORNEY FOR HEALTH CARE.
(E)(D) A PETITION MAY BE FILED UNDER SECTION 2101.24 FOR
ANY ONE OR MORE OF THE FOLLOWING PURPOSES;
(1) DETERMINING WHETHER THE POWER OF ATTORNEY FOR
HEALTH CARE IS IN EFFECT OF HAS BEEN REVOKED OR
TERMINATED.
(2) DETERMINING WHETHER THE ACTS OR PROPOSED ACTS OF
THE ATTORNEY-IN-FACT ARE CONSISTENT WITH THE WISHES OF
THE PRINCIPAL AS EXPRESSED IN THE POWER OF ATTORNEY FOR
HEALTH CARE OR AS INFERRED FROM THE LIFESTYLE AND
CHARACTER OF THE PRINCIPAL, AND FROM OTHER EVIDENCE OF
THE DESIRES OF THE PRINCIPAL, PRIOR TO HIS BECOMING NO
LONGER ABLE TO MAKE INFORMED DECISIONS OR WHERE THE
WISHES OF THE PRINCIPAL ARE UNKNOWN OR UNCLEAR, WHETHER
THE ACTS OR PROPOSED ACTS OF THE ATTORNEY-IN-FACT ARE
CLEARLY CONTRARY TO THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE PRINCIPAL.
(3) DETERMINING WHETHER THE POWER OF ATTORNEY FOR
HEALTH CARE WAS EXECUTED WHEN THE PRINCIPAL WAS NOT OF
SOUND MIND OR WAS UNDER OR SUBJECT TO DURESS, FRAUD OR
UNDUE INFLUENCE.
(4) DETERMINING WHETHER THE POWER OF ATTORNEY FOR
HEALTH CARE IS REVOKED UPON A DETERMINATION BY THE
COURT THAT THE ATTORNEY-IN-FACT HAS MADE A HEALTH CARE
DECISION FOR THE PRINCIPAL THAT AUTHORIZED ANYTHING
ILLEGAL; PROVIDED, HOWEVER, THE REVOCATION OF A POWER OF
ATTORNEY UNDER THIS SUBSECTION SHALL BE IN THE DISCRETION
OF THE COURT.
(5) DETERMINING WHETHER THE POWER OF ATTORNEY FOR
HEALTH CARE IS REVOKED UPON A DETERMINATION BY THE
COURT OF BOTH OF THE FOLLOWING:
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1993
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(a) The attorney-in-fact has violated, failed to perform or is unable to
perform the duty under the power of attorney for health care to act in a matter
consistent with the desires of the principal or where the desires of the principal
are unknown or unclear, is acting in a manner that is clearly contrary to the best
interests of the principal; and
(b) AT THE TIME OF THE DETERMINATION BY THE COURT, THE
PRINCIPAL LACKS THE CAPACITY TO REVOKE THE POWER OF
ATTORNEY FOR HEALTH CARE.
(6) A PETITION MAY BE FILED BY ANY OF THE FOLLOWING:
(a) THE PRINCIPAL.
(b) THE ATTORNEY-IN-FACT.
(c) THE GUARDIAN OF THE PRINCIPAL.
(d) THE SPOUSE, ADULT CHILD, PARENT OR SIBLING OF THE
PRINCIPAL.
(e) AN ADULT WITH A SIGNIFICANT PERSONAL RELATIONSHIP
TO THE PRINCIPAL
(f)
THE ATTENDING PHYSICIAN OR HEALTH CARE PROVIDER OF
THE PRINCIPAL.
(F)(-) If the attending physician of a principal and one other physiian who
the prinipal determine that he is in a terminal
ndition or ines
e. i
additienally
determines
physieian
state,
if
the
attending
permanently unconscious
that the principal has lost the capacity to make informed health care decisions for
himself and that there is n reas.nable possibility that the prinipal will regain
the apaity to make informed health care deisions for himself, an if the
attorney in fact under the principal's durable power of attorney for health care
or
.se t.iutin, Or themakes a health care decision pertairng to the
withholding or withdrawal, of life sust.. ning treatment, then the attending
physician shall do All ofete following
(a) R record the determinations and health care decision in the principal's
medical record.
(b) Make a goed faith effort, and use reasonable diligence, to notify the
with the following descending
efe
apprpiat.e individual or individual, in acJdl
orde
ofroity, of the determinations and health care decision:
(i)Ifnyth guardian of the principal. This division does notpemto
pemting or rquing the appointment of.
quire, and shall nte
a guardian for the principal.
(ii) The principal's spouese;
(iii) The principal's adult children who a.e available witif a reasonable
period of timne for consultationt with the principal's attending physician;
(iv) The principal's parent
(v) Ant adult sibling of the princeipal or, if there is fnore than onte adult
sibling, a majority of the principal's adult siblings who are available within 9
reasonable period of timne for such eonsultation;
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(e) Reeord in the principal's mnedical record the names of the individual 01r
individuals notified pursuant to division (D)(1)(b) of this sectiont and the mannmef
of netifieatiefF

(d) Afford timne for the individual or individuals notified pursuiant to
division (D)(l)(b) of this section to object int the mnannfer described in division
(D)(3)(a) of ths sectiont.
(2)(a) if, despite makdig a good faith effort, and despite using reasniabl
diligence, to notify the appropriate individual or indi-vidusls described int divisiont
(D)(l)(b) of this section, the attending physician cannot notify the inidividualo
individuals of the determninations and health care decision because the individual
or individuals are deceased, cannot be locaed, or cannot be notified for soe
other reasen, then the requiremaents of divisions (D)(l)(b), (e), and (d) of thi
seetion and, except as provided int division (D)(3)(b) of this section, the
provisions of divisions (D)(3) to (6) of this sectiont shall not apply int connectionewith the principal. However, the attending physician shall record in th
principal's mnedical record iniformationt pertaining to the reason for the failure to
provide the requisite noetices and informfation pertainting to the naure of the good
faith efforft and reasonable diligence used.
(b) The reurmnsof divisionts (9)(1)(b), (e), and (d) of tis section nd
excpt s povided int division (D)(3)(b) of this sectiont, theprvsoso
divisions (D)(3) to (6) of this sectiont shall not apply in conec itio wOith the
principal if only one individual would hae to be notified pursuant to division
(D)(l)(b) of this section and that individual is the attorney in fact under the
durable power of attorney for health care. However-, the attending physician o
the principal shall rerd int the principal's mnedical reord information indicating
i eprsumat to divsiont (9)(1)(b) of this section becautse -et
that no notie w
the provisions of division (D)(2)(b) of this section.
(3)(a) Within forty eight hourfs after receipt of a notice pursuant to division
(D)(1) of this section, any individual so notified shall advise the atending
physieian of the principal whether he objects on a basis specified in division
(D))(4)(e) of this section. if an objection as described int that divisiont is
commfunicated to the attending physicianm, then, within two business days after
he idiviual.hal file a complaint as described in division
the ommuicaton,
(D)(4) of this sectiont in the probate court of the county int which the principali
located, if the intdividual fails to so file a complaint, his objectionts as described-in
division (D)(4)(c) of this sectiont shall be considered to be -void.
(b) Within forty eight hours after the priority individual or any mnember of-a
prierit' class of individual receives a notic puruat to division (D)(1) of this
sectiont or within forty eight hours after infor-ation-R pertaining to an unnotifiedi
priority individual or unnotified priority class of individuals is recorded int a
principal's mnedical record pursuanit to divisiont (D)(2)(a) or- (b) ef this section, th
individual or a majority of the individuals in the ntext class of individuals tha
pertains to the principal in the descending order of priority set forth int divisin
(D))(l)(b)(i) to (Y) of this sectiont shall advise the attending physician ofth
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princeipal whether he of: they obe on a basis specified in divisien (ED)(4)(c)o
this section. if an objection as described in that division is commumoiated to the
attending physician, then, within twe business days after the comfmunlcationt, the
objecting individual of! majority shall file a eomplaint is described in divisiont (D)
(4) of this seetiont in the probate court of the eounty in which the principali
located. if the objecting individual or majority fails to file a complaint, hiso
their objectionts as described int di'vision (D)(4)(e) of this section shall b
considered to be void.
(1) cmplaint of an inadividual that is filed in accordance with division
(D)(3)(a) of this section or of an individua or majority of individuals that is filed
ifn accordance with division (D)(3)(b) of this sectiont shall satisfy all of the
fellewifig!
(a) Name any health care facility in which the pfincipal is confined;,
(b) Name the pfincipal, his attending physiciant, and the consulting
physician associated with the determinationt that the principal is in a terminal
conditiont oriFipraenfly uinconscious state;
(c) ndiatewheherthe plaintiff or plaintiffs objeet oft one or! moere of thc
feeng bases
(i) To the attending physiciant's determinationt that the principali has lost the
capaciy to ake informed health carfe decisions for himnselff,
(it) Toe the attendinig physician's detefminationt that there is noe reaso nable
possibility that the princeipal wg-ill regaint the capacity to make informed health
care decisions for imself,
(iii) That, in eerisin his authority, the attorney int fact is not acting
conisistently with the desires of the principal or, if the desires of the principal are
ualknown, int the best interest of the pincipal;,
(iv) That the durable power of attorney for health care has expired or
otherwise is no longer! effective;
(Y) To the attending physiciant's and consuilting physician's deternminn
state;
that the princeipal is in a terminial condition cr in a permfanenitly. unoi
(vi) That the attorney in fact's health care decision pertaining to the use Or
continuiation, or the withholding or withdrawal, of life sustaining treatment is not
authorized by the durable power of attorney for heath care or is prohibited undei
section 1337.13 of the Revised Code;
(-vii) That the durable power of attorney for health care was execuited when
the princeipal was not of sound mind or was unfder or subject to duress, fraud, ci
undue influence;
(viii) That the durable power of attorney for healt care otherwise does not
subsatially comply with sectiont 1337.12 of the Revised Cede.
(d) Request the proebate court to issue onte or moeof Hte following types of
order-si
(i) An order to the attending physician to reevaluate, int light of the court
proceeedings, the detenination that the principal has lost the capacity to make
iformed healt care decisions for himself, the determintationt that the princeipal i~
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cottuon or it a permafnentty unc
ietts State, or: unte
determination that there is no reasonable possibility that the principal shall Fegain
the
to make infrmed health care decisiens
.apa.ity
fr- himself,
(ii) An order to the attrney in faet to a t onsistently with the desires fth
principal or, if the desires of the principal wre unknown, in the best interest ofth
principal in exercising his authority, or to make only health care decision
pertaining to life sustaining treatment that are auithorized by the durable power of
attorney for health care and that are not prohibited under sectiont 1337.13 ofth
Revised Goet,
(iii) An order invalidating the durable power of attorney for health care
beause it has expired or other-wise is no longer effetive, it was executed when
the princeipal was not of souind mind or was under or subject to duress, fraud, of
undue influence, or it otherwise does net substantially comply with seetior.
1337.12 of the Revised Code;
(e) Be accomnpanied by an aiffidavit of the plaintiff or plaintiffs that include
avefffents relative to whether he is an individuial or they ar~e individuals is
described in division(D()()() (ii), (iii), (iv), or (Y) of this sectiont and to the
factual basis for his or their objections;
(f) Namfe anty inidividuals who were notified by the attending physician in
accordance with division (D) (1) (b) of this section and who are no-onn nthe
complaint as plaintiffs;
(g) Namne, in the caption of the complaint, as defendants the attending
physician of the princeipal, the attorney in fact under the durable power of
attorney for health care, the consulting physicia associted with the
determination that the princeipal is in a teminal condition or in a permanently
unoious state, aly, health are facility in whch the principl is confined, and
anty individuals who were notified by the attending physician in accordance wit
division (D)(1)(b) of this section and who are noet joining in the complaint as
plainiffs.
(5) Notwithstanding any eentr; prvsino the Revised Code or ofth
Rules of Civil Procedure, the state and persons other than an objecting individuafl
as dcseribed in division (D)(3)(a) of this section, other than an objecting
individual or majority of individuals as described int division (D)(3)(b) of thi
section, and other than perseas described int division (D)(4)(g) of this sectionar
prohibited from commencing a civil action under division (9) of this section and
from joining or being joined as parties to an action commenced under division
(D) of this section, including joining by way of intervention.
(6)(a) A probate eelu:,# in wic~--h a complaint as described in division (E)"4
of this section is filed within the period specified int division (D))(3)(a) Or (b) of
this sectiont shaH conducet a hearing on the complaint after a copy of it and r.
notice of the hearing have been served upon the defendants. The clerk of th
proebate court in which the complaint is filed shall cause the complaint and th
notice of the hearing to be so served in accordancee with the Rules of Ci-vil
Proceedure, which service shall be maade, if possible, within three days after the
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filing of the complaint. The hearing shall be conducted at the earliest possil
time, but no later than the third business day after such sen'ice has been
completed. Immnediately following the hearing, the court shall eniter on its
journal its determination whether a requested order will be issd.
(b) if the heaalth cae decision of the attorey in fact authorized the use oe
conitinuation of life sustaining treaftmnent and if the plaintiff or plaintiffs requeste
a reevaluiation order to the attending physician of the principal or ant order to the
attorney int fact as described in divisiont (D)(4)(d)(i) or (ii) of this sectiont,-the
curt shall issue the requested order only if it finds that the plaintiff or plaintiffs
have established a factual, basis for the objectiont or objections involved by clea
and convinceing evidence and, if applicable, to a reasontable degree of mnedica
ertainity and int accordance with reasonable mnedical standards.
(e) if the health care decision of the attorney in fact authorized the
withholding or withdrawal of life sustaining treatment and if the plaintiff ot
plaintiffs requested a reevaluationt order to the attending physicianl of the
principal or ant order to the attorney int fact as described in division (D)(4)(d)(i) Ot
(ii) of this section, the court shall issue the requested order only if it finds that th

plaintiff or plaintiffs have established a factual basis for the objection oi
objectionts involved by a preponderance of the evidence and, if applicable, too
reasonable degree of mnedical certainty and int accordance with reasonabl
mnedical standards.
(d) if the plainttiff or plaintiffs requested an invalidation order as describe
int divisiont (D))(4)(d)(iii) of this section, the courft shall issue the order only if-it
finds that the plaintiff or plaintiffs have established a factuial basis for the
objectiont or objections involved by clear and conivincing evidence.
(e) if the coutrt issues a reevaluation order to the princeipal's attending
physician pursuant to division (D)(6)(b) or (e) of this section, thent the attending
physician shall make the requisite reevaluiationt. If, after doing so, the attendinig
physician again determines that the principal has lost the caact t
ake
informed health care decisions for himself, that the principal is in a terminal
asonbl
apemently unconscious state, or that there inor
conditionoin
possibility that the principal will regain the caact tomke iforemed healt-h
care decisions for himself, then he shall notify the court in writing of the
determination and comply with division (B)(2) of this section.
(E) if, at any timne, a priority individual or any mnember of a priority class oe
individuals under division (D)(l)(b) of this sectiont or if, at any timne, the
individual or a major-ity of the individuals in the ntext class of individuals that
pertains to the principal in the descendinig order of priority set forth in tha
division, believes in good faith that both of the following circumstancees apply,
thent the priority individual, the mnember of the priority class of individuals, or the
individual or majority of individuals int the next class of individuals that pertains
to the princeipal may commence an action in the probate court of the counyi
which a principal who is int a terminal coniditioni or permanently uinconsciou
stae is located for the issuance of an order mandating the use or continuation oe
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol26/iss2/5
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comfert care in connection with the prineipal in a manner that is consistcnt with
setiens 1337.11 to 1337.17 of the Revised Code:
(1) Comfort care is net being used or continued in conneetion with the
prineipal
(2) The withholding or withdrawal of the comfort care is contrary to
sectionts 1337.11 to 1337.17 of the Revised Code.
(F) Exeept as proevided int divisions (D) and (E) of this sectiont in cecfetio
with princeipals who are int a termintal condition or inapraetly unconfsciou
state, sections 1337.11 to 1337.17 of the Revised Cod..e ot -- h-ize, and
shall noet be constfued as authorizing, the commenemfent of any civil action in
probate court or.court of cemmon pleas for the purpose of obtaining an e
relative to a health care decision mnade by an attorney int fact under a durabl
power of attorney for health carie
(G) A durable power of attorney for health care, or other document, that-Is
similar to a durable power of atteey for health care athoized by setion
1337.11 toe 1337.17 of the Revised Code, that is or has been eeuted under the
law of another state prior to, on, or
frtr
the effertive date of this amendment
and that substantiallyoemplies with that law or with sections 1337.11 to 1337.71-7
of the Revised Code shall be o nsidered to be Valid for purpses of th
seetiens

1337.17 Use of printed form; notice to principal.
A printed form of durable power of attorney for health care may be sold or
otherwise distributed in this state for use by adults who are not advised by an
attorney. By use of such a printed form, a principal may authorize an attorney in
fact to make health care decisions on his behalf, but the printed form shall not be
used as an instrument for granting authority for any other decisions. Any printed
form that is sold or otherwise distributed in this state for the purpose described in
this section shall include the following notice:
"Notice to Adult Executing This Document
This is an important legal document.
you should know these facts:

Before, executing this document,

This document gives the person you designate (the attorney in fact) the
power to make most* health care decisions for you if you lose the capacity to
make informed health care decisions for yourself. This power is effective only
when your attending physician determines that you have lost the capacity to
make informed health care decisions for yourself and, notwithstanding this
document, as long as you have the capacity to make informed health care
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decisions for yourself, you retain the light to make all medical and other health
care decisions for yourself.
You may include specific limitations in this document on the authority of
the attorney in fact to make health care decisions for you.
Subject to any specific limitations you include in this document, if your
attending physician determines that you have lost the capacity to make an
informed decision on a health care matter, the attorney in fact generally* will be
authorized by this document to make health care decisions for you to the same
extent as you could make those decisions yourself, if you had the capacity to do
so. The authority of the attorney in fact to make health care decisions for you
generally* will include the authority to give informed consent, to refuse to give
informed consent, or to withdraw informed consent to any care, treatment,
service, or procedure to maintain, diagnose, or treat a physical or mental
condition.
However*, even if the attorney in fact has general authority to make health
care decisions for you under this document, the attorney in fact never will be
authorized to do any of the following:
1) Refuse or withdraw informed eonsent to life suistaintng treatment
(i
(unless your attending physician and one other: physician who examines yeu
determine, to a reasonable degree of mnedieal certainty and in accordance wit
reasonable mnedical standards, that either of the f"!owing applies:
(a) Yu am suffeing &fr aft irrversible, AND inra.ble, and untre.table

condiftifn eaused by disease, illness
recovery and (ii) you death is likelyto
sustaining treatment is

a-t

admiistered,

rijr
PPur

fromf whieh (i) there cant be no
ithin a relatively short time if f
and your attending

physician

additionally determines, to a reasonable degree of mnedical ertainty and in
accordance with reasonable mnedical standards, that there is norasoale
health car
capaeity to make ifred
possibility that you will regain the
decisions for yourself.
(b) Yout are in a stae of permanent unonciuses that is characterized by
you being irrversibly unaware of yourself and yorevrnent and by a tota
loss of cerebral cofrtical functio ning, c f -t in you havin
o- a.c . t
expriece ainor uffering, and your attentding physician additionally
detrmiesto a reasontable degree of mnedical certainty and in accordance with
reasonable mnedical standards, that there is noe reasonable possibility that you will
ake iformed health care decisionts for yourself);
regain the caact t
(M (1) Refuse or withdraw informed consent to health care necessary to
provide you with comfort care (except that, if he is not prohibited froma doing SO
under (4) bew, the attorney int fact could refuse or vithdrafw iforemed consent
to the proevisiont of nutrtieft or hydrationt to you as described under (4) below).
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol26/iss2/5
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(Ye should understand that comfort eare is defined int Ohio law to mean
) or fluid
artifi-ially or tehfnolgially administered sustenatn e (nutritinr
(hydration) when administered to dimnish your pain or discomlfort, net t
pestpente your death, and any other mtedial or nuri rinaure, treatent,
interventien, or other measure that would be taken to diminish your pin or
disnoufrt, not to postpiine your death. Consequently, if your attending
physiian were to deteroine that a previcusly desribed nedial aord
nurcs
prtedureaee itsention, or othe feasure allnot or no longer will
serve to provide comfort to you or alleviate your pain, thent, subject to (4) belo!
your attorney in fact would be authorized to refuise or withdraw intformed consent
to the proedure, teatment, intervention, oro ther easure.*);
(4) (2) Refuse or withdraw informed consent to health care for you if you
are pregnant and if the refusal or withdrawal would terminate the pregnancy
(unless the pregnancy or health care would pose a substantial risk to your life, or
unless your attending physician and at least one other physician who examines
you determine, to a reasonable degree of medical certainty and in accordance
with reasonable medical standards, that the fetus would not be born alive);
(4) Refuse or withdraw informed consent to the provisiont of arifieially 01
teehnolegieally administered sustenance (ntutritiont) or! fluids (hydraion) to you,
unless:
pr
enfly unconscious state.
(a) Yout Ewe int a terminal conditiont ori
(b) Your attending physician and at least one other physician who his
examined yout determine, to a reasonable degree of mnedical certainty and in
accordance with reasonable medical standards, that nutrition or hydration will not
or no longer will serve to provide comfort to you or alleviate your pain
prmertly unconscious state, you authorize
(e) If, but erAy if, you aei
informed consent to the prvsino
wxithdraw
refe
o
r
in
fact
to
attorney
the
ntutrtieft or hydration to you by doing both of the following int thfis document:2
(i) Including a statement int capital letters that the atorney int fact may
refuse or withdraw iformed consent to the provision of nutritiont or hydrationt
in apranently unconscious state and if the determinationt tha
you if youe
nutrition or hyRtinAllnt or noe longer will serve to provide comfort to yout ot
alleviate you piismde, or ehecing or other-wise fnaldcng a box or line -(if
anty) that is adjacent to a simnilar statement efn this doen~fet;
(ii) Plain you in itials or signature underneath or adjaenft toth
statement, ceck, or other ark previously described.
(d) Your attending physician determn in goo-d faith, that you authorized
the attorney in fact to refuse or withdraw in."forfmed consent to the proevisiont of
ently unconscious state by
ntmitiont or hydration to you if you are in a er
complying with the requirementls of (4)(e)(i) and (ii) above.
(5S) (3) Withdraw informed consent to any health care to which you
previously consented, unless a change in your physical condition has
significantly decreased the benefit of that health care to you, or unless the health
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care is not, or is no longer, significantly effective in achieving the purposes for
which you consented to its use.
Additionally, when exercising his authority to make health care decisions
for you, the attorney in fact will have to act consistently with your desires or, if
your desires are unknown, to act in your best interest. You may express your
desires to the attorney in fact by including them in this document or by making
them known to him in another manner.
When acting pursuant to this document, the attorney in fact generally* will
have the same rights that you have to receive information about proposed health
care, to review health care records, and to consent to the disclosure of health care
records. You can limit that right in this document if you so choose.
Generally, you may designate any competent adult as the attorney in fact
under this document. However, you cannot* designate your attending physician
or the administrator of any nursing home in which you are receiving care as the
attorney in fact under this document. Additionally, you cannot* designate an
employee or agent of your attending physician, or an employee or agent of a
health care facility at which you are being treated, as the attorney in fact under
this document, unless either type of employee or agent is a competent adult and
related to you by blood, marriage, or adoption, or unless either type of employee
or agent is a competent adult and you and the employee or agent are members of
the same religious order.
This document has no expiration date under Ohio law, but you may choose
to specify a date upon which your durable power of attorney for health care
generally will expire. However, if you specify an expiration date and then lack
the capacity to make informed health care decisions for yourself on that date, the
document and the power it grants to your attorney in fact will continue in effect
until you regain the capacity to make informed health care decisions for yourself.
You have the right to revoke the designation of the attorney in fact and the
right to revoke this entire document at any time and in any manner. Any such
revocation generally will be effective when you express your intention to make
the revocation. However, if you made your attending physician aware of this
document, any such revocation will be effective only when you communicate it
to your attending physician, or when a witness to the revocation or other health
care personnel to whom the revocation is communicated by such a witness
communicate it to your attending physician.
If you execute this document and create a valid durable power of attorney
for health care with it, it will revoke any prior, valid durable power of attorney
for health care that you created, unless you indicate otherwise in this document.
This document is not valid as a durable power of attorney for health care
unless it is acknowledged before a notary public or is signed by at least two adult
witnesses who are present when you sign or acknowledge your signature. No
person who is related to you by blood, marriage, or adoption may be a witness.
The attorney in fact, your attending physician, and the administrator of any
nursing home in which you are receiving care also are ineligible to be witnesses.
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol26/iss2/5
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If there is anything in this document that you do not understand, you should
ask your lawyer to explain it to you." In the preceding notice, the single words,
and the two sentences in the second set of parentheses in paragraph (2), followed
by an asterisk and all of paragraph (4) should appear in the printed form in
capital letters.
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Appendix B
CHAPTER 2133:
MODIFIED UNIFORM RIGHTS
OF THE TERMINALLY ILL ACT
Section
2133.01
2133.02
2133.03
2133.04
2133.05
2133.06
2133.07
2133.08
2.0
2133.10
2133.11
2133.12
2133.13
2133.14
2133.15

Definitions.
Declaration governing use or continuation, or withholding or
withdrawal, of life sustaining treatment; refusal to comply.
When declaration becomes operative; declaration supersedes
general consent to treatment or durable power of attorney for health
care.
Revocation of declaration.
Duties of attending physi.ian when declarati n becmes operative;
Notice to certain persons; complaint by objecting person.
Patient may make decisions as long as able; effect of pregnancy.
Use of printed form.
Certain persons may consent to withholding or withdrawing lifesustaining treatment from patient; complaint by objecting person.
Conditions for withholding or withdrawing nutition and hydraitti
fia patient who has been in a permanently annsious state for
at least twelve months.
Transfer of patient to physician or facility willing to comply.
Immunity from civil or criminal liability or professional
disciplinary action.
Death is not a suicide or homicide; health or life insurance or
annuity rights not affected; no presumption created; limitations on
effect of chapter; comfort care.
Assumption of validity of declaration.
Out-of-state declaration valid.
Application to document executed prior to effective date of
provisions.

2133.01 Definitions.
Unless the context otherwise requires, as used in this chapter:
(A) "Adult" means an individual who is eighteen years of age or older.
(B) "Attending physician" means the physician to whom a declarant or
other patient, or his family, has assigned primary responsibility for the treatment
or care of the declarant or other patient, or, if the declarant or other patient, or his
family, has not assigned that responsibility, the physician who has accepted that
responsibility.
(C) "Comfort care" means any of the following:
(1) Nutrition when administered to diminish the pain or discomfort of
declarant or other patient, not to postpone his death;
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(2) Hydration when administered to diminish the pain or discomfort of a
declarant or other patient, not to postpone his death;
(3) Any other medical or nursing procedure, treatment, intervention, or
other measure that is taken to diminish the pain or discomfort of a declarant or
other patient, not to postpone his death.
(D) "Consulting physician" means a physician who, in conjunction with the
attending physician of a declarant or other patient, makes one or more
determinations that are required to be made by the attending physician, or to be
made by the attending physician and one other physician, by an applicable
provision of this chapter, to a reasonable degree of medical certainty and in
accordance with reasonable medical standards.
(E) "Declarant" means any adult who has executed a declaration in
accordance with section 2133.02 of the Revised Code.
(F) "Declaration" means a written document executed in accordance with
section 2133.02 of the Revised Code.
(G) "Durable power of attorney for health care" means a document created
pursuant to sections 1337.11 to 1337.17 of the Revised Code.
(H) "Guardian" means a person appointed by a probate court pursuant to
Chapter 2111 of the Revised Code to have the care and management of the
person of an incompetent.
(I) "Health care facility" means any of the following:
(1) A hospital;
(2) A hospice care program or other institution that specializes in comfort
care of patients in a terminal condition or in a permanently unconscious state;
(3) A nursing home;
(4) A home health agency;
(5) An intermediate care facility for the mentally retarded.
(J) "Health care personnel" means physicians, nurses, physician's assistants,
emergency medical technicians-ambulance, advanced emergency medical
technicians-ambulance, emergency medical technicians-paramedic, medical
technicians, dietitians, other authorized persons acting under the direction of an
attending physician, and administrators of health care facilities.
(K) "Home health agency" has the same meaning as in section 3701.88 of
the Revised Code.
(L) "Hospice care program" has the same meaning as in section 3712.01 of
the Revised Code.
(M) "Hospital" has the same meanings as in sections 2108.01, 3701.01, and
5122.01 of the Revised Code.
(N) "Hydration" means fluids that are artificially or technologically
administered.
(0) "Incompetent" has the same meaning as in section 2111.01 of the
Revised Code.
(P) "Intermediate care facility for the mentally retarded" has the same
meaning as in section 5111.20 of the Revised Code.
(Q) "Life-sustaining treatment" means any medical procedure, treatment,
intervention, or other measure that, when administered to a qualified patient or
other patient, will serve principally to prolong the process of dying.
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(R) "Nurse" means a person who is licensed to practice nursing as a
registered nurse or to practice practical nursing as a licensed practical nurse
pursuant to Chapter 4723. of the Revised Code.
(S) "Nursing home" has the same meaning as in section 3721.01 of the
Revised Code.
(T) "Nutrition" means sustenance that is artificially or technologically
administered.
(U) "Permanently unconscious state" means a state of permanent
unconsciousness in a declarant or other patient that, to a reasonable degree of
medical certainty as determined in accordance with reasonable medical standards
by the declarant's or other patient's attending physician and one other physician
who has examined the declarant or other patient, is characterized by both of the
following:
(1) The declarant or other patient is irreversibly unaware of himself and his
environment.
(2) There is a total loss of cerebral cortical functioning, resulting in the
declarant or other patient having no capacity to experience pain or suffering.
(V) "Person" has the same meaning as in section 1.59 of the Revised Code
and additionally includes political subdivisions and governmental agencies,
boards, commissions, departments, institutions, offices, and other
instrumentalities.
(W) "Physician" means a person who is licensed to practice medicine or
surgery or osteopathic medicine and surgery pursuant to Chapter 4731. of the
Revised Code, or a person who otherwise is authorized to practice medicine or
surgery or osteopathic medicine and surgery in this state.
(X) "Political subdivision" and "state" have the same meanings as in section
2744.01 of the Revised Code.
(Y) "Professional disciplinary action" means action taken by the board or
other entity that regulates the professional conduct of health care personnel,
including the state medical board and the board of nursing.
(Z) "Qualified patient" means an adult who has executed a declaration and
has been determined to be in a terminal condition or in a permanently
unconscious state.
(AA) "Terminal condition" means an irreversible, AND incurable--and
untreatable condition caused by disease, illness, or injury from which, to a
reasonable degree of medical certainty as determined in accordance with
reasonable medical standards by a declarant's or other patient's attending
physician, and one other physician who has examined the declarant or other
patient, both of the following apply:
(1) There can be no recovery.
(2) Death is likely to occur within a relatively short time if life-sustaining
treatment is not administered.
(BB) "Tort action" means a civil action for damages for injury, death, or
loss to person or property, other than a civil action for damages for breach of a
contract or another agreement between persons.
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2133.02 Declaration governing use or continuation, or withholding or
withdrawal, of life sustaining treatment; refusal to comply.
(A)(1) An adult who is of sound mind voluntarily may execute at any time a
declaration governing the use or continuation, or the withholding or withdrawal,
of life-sustaining treatment. The declaration shall be signed by the declarant or
by another individual at the direction of the declarant, state the date of its
execution, and either be witnessed as described in division (B)(1) of this section
or be acknowledged by the declarant in accordance with division (B)(2) of this
section. The declaration may include a designation by the declarant of one or
more persons who are to be notified by the declarant's attending physician at any
time that life-sustaining treatment would be withheld or withdrawn pursuant to
the declaration.
(2) Depending upon whether the declarant intends his declaration to apply
when he is in a terminal condition, in a permanently unconscious state or in
either a terminal condition or a permanently unconscious state, his declaration
shall use either or both of the terms "terminal condition" and "permanently
unconscious state," and shall define or otherwise explain those terms in capital
letters and in a manner that is substantially consistent with the provisions of
section 2133.01 of the Revised Code.
(3)(a) If a declarant who has authorized the withholding or withdrawal of
life-sustaining treatment intends that his attending physician withhold or
withdraw nutrition or hydration when he is in a permanently unconscious state
and when the nutrition and hydration will not or no longer will serve to provide
comfort to him or alleviate his pain, then the declarant shall authorize his
attending physician to withhold or withdraw nutrition or hydration when he is in
the permanently unconscious state by doing both of the following in the
declaration:
(i) Including a statement in capital letters that is attending physician may
withhold or withdraw nutrition and hydration if he is in a permanently
unconscious state and if his attending physician and at least one other physician
who has examined him determine, to a reasonable degree of medical certainty
and in accordance with reasonable medical standards, that nutrition or hydration
will not or no longer will serve to provide comfort to him or alleviate his pain, or
checking or otherwise marking a box or line that is adjacent to a similar
statement on a printed form of a declaration;
(ii) Placing his initials or signature underneath or adjacent to the statement
check, or other mark described in division (A)(3)(a)(i) of this section.
(b) Division (A)(3)(a) of this section does not apply, and shall not be
construed as applying, to the extent that a declaration authorizes the withholding
or withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment when a declarant is in a terminal
condition. The provisions of division (E) of section 2133.12 of the Revised Code
pertaining to comfort care shall apply to a declarant in a terminal condition.
(B)(1) If witnessed for purposes of division (A) of this section, a declaration
shall be witnessed by two individuals as described in this division in whose
presence the declarant, or another individual at the direction of the declarant,
signed the declaration. The witnesses to a declaration shall be adults who are not
related to the declarant by blood, marriage, or adoption, who are not the attending
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physician of the declarant, and who are not the administrator of any nursing
home in which the declarant is receiving care. Each witness shall subscribe his
signature on the declaration and, by doing so, attest to his belief that the declarant
appears to be of sound mind and not under or subject to duress, fraud, or undue
influence.
(2) If acknowledged for purposes of division (A) of this section, a
declaration shall be acknowledged before a notary public, who shall make the
certification described in section 147.53 of the Revised Code and also shall attest
that the declarant appears to be of sound mind and not under or subject to duress,
fraud, or undue influence.
(C) An attending physician, or other health care personnel acting under the
direction of an attending physician, who is furnished a copy of a declaration shall
make it a part of the declarant's medical record and, when section 2133.05 of the
Revised Code is applicable, also shall comply with that section.
(D)(1) Subject to division (D)(2) of this section, an attending physician of a
declarant or a health care facility in which a declarant is confined may refuse to
comply or allow compliance with the declarant's declaration on the basis of a
matter of conscience or on another basis. An employee or agent of an attending
physician of a declarant or of a health care facility in which a declarant is
confined may refuse to comply with the declarant's declaration on the basis of a
matter of conscience.
(2) If an attending physician of a declarant or a health care facility in which
a declarant is confined is not willing or not able to comply or allow compliance
with the declarant's declaration, the physician or facility promptly shall so advise
the declarant and comply with the provisions of section 2133.10 of the Revised
Code, or, if the declaration has become operative as described in division (A) of
section 2133.03 of the Revised Code, shall comply with the provisions of section
2133.10 of the Revised Code.
2133.03 When declaration becomes operative, declaration supersedes
general to treatment or durable power of attorney for health care.
(A)(1) A declaration becomes operative when it is communicated to the
attending physician of the declarant, the attending physician and one other
physician who examines the declarant determine that the declarant is in a
terminal condition or in a permanently unconscious state, whichever is addressed
in the declaration, the applicable requirement of divisions (A)(2) and (3) of this
section are satisfied, and the attending physician determines that the declarant no
longer is able to make informed decisions regarding the administration of lifesustaining treatment. When the declaration becomes operative, the attending
physician and health care facilities shall act in accordance with its provisions or
comply with the provisions of section 2133.10 of the Revised Code.
(2) In order for a declaration to become operative in connection with a
declarant who is in a permanently unconscious state, the consulting physician
associated with the determination that the declarant is in the permanently
unconscious state shall be a physician who, by virtue of advanced education or
training, of a practice limited to particular diseases, illnesses, injuries, therapies,
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or branches of medicine or surgery or osteopathic medicine and surgery, of
certification as a specialist in a particular branch of medicine or surgery or
osteopathic medicine and surgery, or of experience acquired in the practice of
medicine or surgery or osteopathic medicine and surgery, is qualified to
determine whether the declarant is in a permanently unconscious state.
(3) In order for a declaration to become operative in connection with a
declarant who is in a terminal condition or in a permanently unconscious state,
the attending physician of the declarant shall determine, in good faith, to a
reasonable degree of medical certainty, and in accordance with reasonable
medical standards, that there is no reasonable possibility that the declarant will
regain the capacity to make informed decisions regarding the administration of
life-sustaining treatment.
(B)(1) A declaration supersedes any general consent to treatment form
signed by or on behalf of the declarant prior to, upon, or after his admission to a
health care facility to the extent there is a conflict between the declaration and the
form, even if the form is signed after the execution of the declaration. To the
extent that the provisions of a declaration and a general consent to treatment form
do not conflict, both documents shall govern the use or continuation, or the
withholding or withdrawal, of life-sustaining treatment and other medical or
nursing procedures, treatments, preventions, or other measures in connection
with the declarant. This division does not apply if a declaration is revoked
pursuant to section 2133.04 of the Revised Code after the signing of a general
consent to treatment form.
(2) If a declarant has both a valid durable power of attorney for health care and
a valid declaration, the declaration supersedes the durable power of attorney for
health care to the extent that the provisions of the documents would conflict if the
declarant should be in a terminal condition or in a permanently unconscious state.
This division does not apply if the declarant revokes his declaration pursuant to
section 2133.04 of the Revised Code.
2133.04 Revocation of declaration.
(A) A declarant may revoke a declaration at any time and in any manner.
The revocation shall be effective when the declarant expresses his intention to
revoke the declaration, except that, if the declarant made his attending physician
aware of the declaration, the revocation shall be effective upon its
communication to the attending physician of the declarant by the declarant
himself, a witness to the revocation, or other health care personnel to whom the
revocation is communicated by such a witness. Absent actual knowledge to the
contrary, the attending physician of a declarant and other health care personnel
who are informed of the revocation of a declaration by an alleged witness may
rely on the information and act in accordance with the revocation.
(B) Upon the communication as described in division (A) of this section to
the attending physician of a declarant of the fact that his declaration has been
revoked, the attending physician or other health care personnel acting under the
direction of the attending physician shall make the fact a part of the declarant's
medical record.
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2133.05 Complaint by objecting person.
(A) If the attending physician of a declarant and one other physician who
examines the declarant determine that he is in a terminal condition or in a
permanently unconscious state, whichever is addressed in the declaration, if the
attending physician additionally determines that the declarant no longer is able to
make informed decisions regarding the administration of life-sustaining treatment
for himself and that there is no reasonable possibility that the declarant will
regain the capacity to make those informed decisions for himself, and if the
attending physician is aware of the existence of the declarant's declaration, then
the attending physician shall do all of the following:
(1) Record the determinations, together with the terms of the declaration or
any copy of the declaration acquired as described in division (C) of section
2133.02 of the Revised Code, in the declarant's medical record;
(2)(a)(i) If the declarant designated in his declaration one or more persons
to be notified at any time that life-sustaining treatment would be withheld or
withdrawn pursuant to the declaration, make a good faith effort, and use
reasonable diligence, to notify that person or those persons.. eithe- ef- thfollowing of the determinations:
(ii) if division (A)(2)(a)(i) of this sectiont is net applicable, the apprepriatc
individual or individuals, int aecordancee with the following, descending Ofdcr0
priority: if any, the guardiant of the deelartnt, but this division doeo pemt Of
reurad
shall net be eonstrued as pemitting er requiring, the appointment of
a guardian for the declarant; the deelarant's spouse; the deelarant's adult children
wh are available
.
within a reasonable period of time for consultation wit
deelarant's attending physician; the declarant's parents; or an adult sibling of thc
declarant or, if there is mere than one adult sibling, a majerity of the dccleaant's
adult siblings who are available within a reasonable period of timne fer such
(b) The attending physician shall record in the deelarant's mnedical reeeri
the nafes of the individual or individuals notified pursuant to divisiont (A)(2)(a
of this section and the manner of notification.
(e) if, despite mnaldng a good faith effort, and despt sn renable
diligence, to notify the appropriate individual or individualsdecrbe in division
(A)(2)(a) of this section, the attending physician cannot noetify the individualo
individuias of the detefininations
ieas
he individual or individuals afc
deceased, cafnot be located, or cannot be notified for some other reason, thent the
r.quremets of divisions (A)(2)(a) and (b) and (3) of this sectiont and, exeptas
proevided in divisiont (B) (1) (b) of this section, the provisions of division (B) ot
tis seetion shall not apply int connectiont with the deelarant and his declarationt.
However, the attending physiciant shall record int the declarant's mnedical reeor
infermation pertaining to the reasont for the failure to provide the requisite noetices
and informationt pertaining to the nature of the good faith effort and reasonlable
dilgenee e
(3) Afford timne for the individual or intdividuals notified int accordafnee wit
divisiont (A)(2) of this section to object in the mannmer described int diviso
(B)(l)(a) of this section.,
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(B) A PETITION MAY BE FILED UNDER SECTION 2101.24 FOR ANY
ONE OR MORE OF THE FOLLOWING PURPOSES;
(1) DETERMINING WHETHER THE DECLARATION IS IN EFFECT
OR HAS BEEN REVOKED OR TERMINATED.
(2) DETERMINING WHETHER THE COURSE OF ACTION
PROPOSED TO BE UNDERTAKEN BY THE ATTENDING PHYSICIAN IS
AUTHORIZED BY THE DECLARANT'S DECLARATION.
(3) DETERMINING WHETHER THE DECLARATION WAS
EXECUTED WHEN THE DECLARANT WAS NOT OF SOUND MIND OR
WAS UNDER OR SUBJECT TO DURESS, FRAUD, OR UNDUE
INFLUENCE.
(4) DETERMINING WHETHER THE DECLARATION OTHERWISE
DOES NOT SUBSTANTIALLY COMPLY WITH THIS CHAPTER.
(5)A PETITION MAY BE FILED BY ANY OF THE FOLLOWING:
(a)THE DECLARANT.
(b)THE ATrORNEY-IN-FACT OR DESIGNEE OF THE DECLARANT.
(c) THE GUARDIAN OF THE DECLARANT.
(d) THE SPOUSE, ADULT CHILD, PARENT, OR SIBLING OF THE
DECLARANT.
(e) AN ADULT WITH A SIGNIFICANT PERSONAL RELATIONSHIP
TO THE DECLARANT.

(f) THE ATENDING PHYSICIAN OR HEALTH CARE PROVIDER OF
THE DECLARANT.

(B)(1)(a) Within frty eight hours after receipt of a notie pursuant to
division (A)(2) of this s.ction, any individual so notified shall advise the
attending physiciant of the deelamnt w4Ahether! he objeet on a basis specified in
division (B)(2)(e) of this section. if an objection as described in that division is
eommunicated to the attending physician, then, within two business days at
the comamunication, the individual shall file a complaint as described in division
(B)(2) of this section in the probate court of the county int whieh the deelamt is
located. if the individual fails to so file a comnplainit, his objections as described in
division (B)(2)(e) of this sectiont shall be considered to be void.
(b) Within forty eight hours after a person described in division (A)(2)(a)(i)
of this sectio or aroity individual or any mnember of a priority classo
individuals describ-ed in division (A)(2)(a)(ii) of this section reevsantie
pursuant to di-visiont (A)(2) of this section or within forty eight hours afe
informfation pertainting to ant unnotified person described in division (A)(2)(a)(i)
of this section or an unnoetified priority individual or unnotified priority class oef
individuals described in division (A)(2)(a)(ii) of this sectiont is recorded in r-a
declarant's mnedical recordpursuant to division (A)(2)(e) of this sectionf, either of
the following shall advise the attending physician of the deelrnt whether he o~
they object on a basis specified int division (B)(2)(e) of this section:.
(i) if a person described in division (A)(2)(a)(i) of this sectiont was notified
pursuiant to division (A)(2) of this sectiont or was the subject of a recordation
tinder divisiont (A)(2)(c) of this sectiont, then the objectiont shall be communicae
by the individual or a majority of the individuals int either of the first two classes
re of priority set
of inidividuals that pertaint to the declarant int the desedn
foith in division (A)(2)(a)(ii) of this sectio.,
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(ii) if an individual or individuals in the descending order of prirt e
f this section were notified pursuant to iiso
eA()a(i
forfth in division
(A)(-2) of this seto reetesbet
of a reerdation under division (A)(2)c
of this section, thent the objection shall be commfunicated by the intdividual r
m~ajerity of the individuals int the next class of individpals that pertains toth
deelarant int the descending or~der of priority set forth int division (A)(2)(a)(ii) o
this seetieniif ant objeetiont as described in division (B)(2)(e) of this section is
communicated to the attending physician int accordance with division (B)(l)(b)(i)
or (ii) of this section, then, within two business days after the commaunication,the
objectinig individual or majority shall file a complaint as described inl division
(B)(2) of this sectiont in the probate eourt of the eeounty in whieh the declaranit is
loeated. if the objeeting individual or majority fails to file a complaint, hiso
their objections as described in divisiont (B)(2)(e) of this section shallb
considered to be void.
(2) A complaint of an individual that is filed in accordancee with division
(B)(l)(a) of this section or of an individual or majortity of individuals that is filed
int accordancee with division (13)(1)(b) of this section shall satisfy all ofe
following:
(a) Name anty health care facility in which the declarant is confined;
(b) Name the declarant, his attending physiciant, and the consulting
physician associated with the determination that the deelafant is in a tefmina
condition orifipraently unconsciouts state, whichever is addressed inth
deelaatow
(e) Indicate whether the plaintiff or plaintiffs object on one or more of the
folwng bases~
(i) To the attending physician's and consulting physician's determinations
that the declarfant is int a tefmineA condition or in a permanenlm
ucnsiu
state,
whichever is addressed in the decleation;
(ii) To the attending physician's determinationt that the deelarant noe lengeiF
is able to make informed decisionts regarding the administration of life sustaining
treatment;
(iii) To the attending physician's determination that there is no reasonable
possibility that the declarant will regain the capacity to make informed decisin
r~egardinig the administration of life stingtratment;
(iv) That the course of action proposed to be underaken by the attending
physician is not authorized by the deelft's deelafation;
(v) That the declarationt was executed when the declarat was not of sound
maind or was under or subject to duress, fraud, or undue ifuenee;
(vi) That the declarationt otherwise does not substantially comply with this
ehater
(d) Request the proebate court to issue one of the following types of orders:
(i) An order to the attending physician to reevaluate, in light of the cour
proceedings, the determiniation that the declarant is in a terminal coniditiont or int a
permanently unconscious state, whichever is addressed in the declar-ation, the
determinationt that the declaranit noe longer is able to make informed decisin
regardinig the administration of life sustaining treatmentt, the determfintationi that
there is no reasonable possibility that the declarant will regain the capacity to
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make these informed dciinr
the eourse of action proposed to be
undeftaken
(ii) Ant order inyalidating the declaration because it was executed when th
declerant was not of sound mnind or was under or subject to duress, fraud, -oi
undue influence, or becatuse it other-wise does not substatially eomply with this
ehapter(e) Be accomnpanied by an affidavit of the plaintiff or plaintiffs that inclues
averments relative to whether he is an individuial or they ere individuials as
described int division (A)(2)(a)(i) or (ii) of this sectiefn and to the factual basis r
his or thcir objections;
(f) Name any individuals who were notified by the attending physician in
accordance with division (A)(2)(a) of this section and who are not joining inth
complaint as plaintiffs;
(g) Nante, in the caption of the complaint, as defendants the attending
physician of the deelarant, the consulting phys'ia asscited with the
detemiinationt that the deelarant is in a terminal conditiont or in a permtanently
uncnscousstate, whichever is addressed int the declartion, any health ce
facility in which the declarant is confined, and any individuals who were notlie.
by the attending physician int accordance with division (A)(2)(a) of this section
and who are not joining in the complaint as plaintiffs.
(3) Notwithstanding any eentmary provision of the Revised Code or of th
Rules of Civil Procedure, the state and persons other than an objecting individual
as described in division (B)(l)(a) of this section, other than ant objecttg
individual or majority of individuals as described in division (B)(2)(b)(i) or (ii) -ot
this section, and other than persons described in division (B)(2)(g) of this section
afe prohibited from oencn
a ivil action under this section and fo
joining or being joined as paftes to an action commenced under this section],
includinlg joining by way of intervention.
(4)(a) A probate court in which a complaint as described in division (B)(2)
of this section is filed within the period specified in division (B)(l)(a) or (")o
this section shall conduct a hearing on the complaint after a copy of th
complaint and a notice of the hearing have been served upon the defendants. The
clerk of the probate cout-t in which the complaint is filed shall causeth
complaint and the notice of the hearing to be so served in accordance with the
Rules of Civil Proceedure, which service shall be made, if possible, within thre
days after th filing' of teemplaint. The hearing shall be conducted at the
earliest possible time, but no later than the third business day after such service
has been completed. Immediately following the hearing, the court shall enter oa
its journal its determination whether a requested order will be issued.
(b) if the deelar-ant's declaratin authorized the use or continuation of lif
sustaining treatment should he be int a terminal conditiont or int a permanently
uncnscousstate and if the plaintiff or plaintiffs requested a reevaluationt ordei
to the attending physiciant of the declarant as described in division (B)(2)(d)(i) of
this section, the couti shall issue the reevaluationt order only if it finds that th
plaintiff or plaintiffs haye established a factual basis for the objection or
objections invoelved by clear and convyincing evidence, to a reasonable degree of
• o

v.'th rziQnntfIz .'.mIitnrii stmA--Ae-rt-ntv
fn-WAie
........
. .. . ...J 9 -. A. in
. wee-t"Pe.,
. . .
.
. ffla;e '
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(e) if the declarant's deelaration authorized the withiholding or withdraw
of life sustaining treatment should he be in a termninal eondition ori
permanentfly uinconsciouts state and if the plaintiff or plaintiffs requeste
reevaluation order to the attending physieiant of the deelarant as described -in
division (B)(2)(d)(i) of this seection, the court shall issue the reevaluation erdei
only if it finds that the plaintiff or plaintiffs have established a fctual basisf
the objection or objections involved by a preponderance of the evidence, to a
reasonable degree f edieal certainty, and in aeerdanee with reasona
gads.
mAedical stand
(d)if the plaintiff or plainiffs equested an invalidation order as desribed
in division (B) (2) (d) (ii) of this seetion, the court shall issue the order ony if it
finds that the plainiff or plaintiffs have established a fftual basis for the
objeetion or objections involved by clear and eonvincing evidence.
(e) if the court issues a reevaluaten ordere to the deelarant's attendin
physiciant pursuant to division (B)(4)(b) or (e) of this section, then the attending
physician shall make the equisite reevaluation. if, ater doing so, the attendintg
physician again determines that the deelarant is in a teninal condition or inth
permasnently uincolnscitous state, that the delarant no longer is able to make
informed decisions regadinfg the administration of life sustaing treatment, thas
there is no reasonable possibility that the delyant will regain the capacity t
make these informed deisions, or that he would undertake the sae proposed
course of action, then he shall notify the court in writing of the detemination to
eceply with the povisions of section 2133.10 of the Revised Cde.
2133.06 Patient may make decisions as long as able; effect of pregnancy.
(A) As long as a qualified patient is able to make informed decisions
regarding the administration of life-sustaining treatment, he may continue to do
SO.
(B) Life-sustaining treatment shall not be withheld or withdrawn from a
declarant pursuant to a declaration if she is pregnant and if the withholding or
withdrawal of the treatment would terminate the pregnancy, unless the declarant's
attending physician and one other physician who has examined the declarant
determine, to a reasonable degree of medical certainty and in accordance with
reasonable medical standards, that the fetus would not be born alive.
2133.07 Use of printed form.
A printed form of a declaration may be sold or otherwise distributed in this
state for use by adults who are not advised by an attorney. By use of such a
printed form, a declarant may authorize the use or continuation, or the
withholding or withdrawal, of life-sustaining treatment should he be in a terminal
condition, a permanently unconscious state, or either a terminal condition or a
permanently unconscious state, may authorize the withholding or withdrawal of
nutrition or hydration should he be in a permanently unconscious state as
described in division (A)(3)(a) of section 2133.02 of the Revised Code, and may
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designate one or more persons who are to be notified by his attending physician
at any time that life-sustaining treatment would be withheld or withdrawn
pursuant to the declaration. The printed form shall not be used as an instrument
for granting any other type of authority or for making any other type of
designation.
2133.08 Certain persons may consent to withholding or withdrawing life
sustaining treatment from patient; complaint by objecting person.
(A)(1) If written consent to the withholding or withdrawal of lifesustaining treatment, witnessed by two individuals who satisfy the witnes
eligibility riteria sct fomth in division (B)() of se . 2133.02 f the Re.
Code-, is given by the appropriate individual or individuals as specified in
division (B) of this section to the attending physician of a patient who is an adult,
and if all of the following apply in connection with the patient, then-stibJeete
sectieon 2133.09 of the Revised Code, his attending physician may withhold or
withdraw the life-sustaining treatment:
(a) The attending physician and one other physician who examines the
patient determine, in good faith, to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, and
in accordance with reasonable medical standards, that the patient is in a
terminal condition or the patient currently is and for at least the immediately
preeding twelve months has been in a permanently unconscious state, and the
attending physician additionally determines, in good faith, to a reasonable
degree of medical certainty, and in accordance with reasonable medical
standards, that the patient no longer is able to make informed decisions regarding
the administration of life-sustaining treatment and that there is no reasonable
possibility that the patient will regain the capacity to make those informed
decisions.
(b) The patient does not have a declaration that addresses his intent should
he be determined to be in a terminal condition or in a permanently unconscious
state, whichever applies, or a durable power of attorney for health care, or has a
document that purports to be such a declaration or durable power of attorney for
health care but that document is not legally effective.
(c) THE PATIENT HAS A VALID DECLARATION OR DURABLE
POWER OF ATTORNEY FOR HEALTH CARE THAT DOES NOT CHECK
OR OTHERWISE MARK A BOX OR LINE THAT IS ADJACENT TO A
STATEMENT THAT AUTHORIZES THE REFUSAL OR WITHDRAWAL OF
INFORMED CONSENT TO THE PROVISION OF NUTRITION OR
HYDRATION TO HIM WHEN HE IS IN A PERMANENTLY
UNCONSCIOUS STATE.
(d)(e) The consent of the appropriate individual or individuals is given after
consultation with the patient's attending physician and after receipt of
information from the patient's attending physician or a consulting physician that
is sufficient to satisfy the requirements of informed consent.
(e)(d) The appropriate individual or individuals who give a consent are of
sound mind and voluntarily give the consent.
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(e) If a donsent would be given under division (B)(3) of this s.tin, the
attending physician mnade a good faith eft,
and used reasonable diligence, to
noetify the patient's adult ehilden who are available within a reasenable period of
timce for eonsultation as described in division (A)( 1)(e) of this section.
(2) The consulting physician under division (A)(1)(a) of this section
associated with a patient allegedly in a permanently unconscious state shall be a
physician who, by virtue of advanced education or training, of a practice limited
to particular diseases, illnesses, injuries, therapies, or branches of medicine or
surgery or osteopathic medicine and surgery, of certification as a specialist in a
particular branch of medicine or surgery or osteopathic medicine and surgery, or
of experience acquired in the practice of medicine or surgery or osteopathic
medicine and surgery, is qualified to determine whether the patient currently is
and for at least the immediately preceding twelve moenths has been in a
permanently unconscious state.
(B) For purposes of division (A) of this section, a consent to withhold or
withdraw life-sustaining treatment may be given by the appropriate individual or
individuals, in accordance with the following descending order of priority:
(1) If any, the guardian of the patient. This division does not permit or
require, and shall not be construed as permitting or requiring, the appointment of
a guardian for the patient.
(2) The patient's spouse;
(3) An adult child of the patient or, if there is more than one adult child, a
majority of the patient's adult children who are available within a reasonable
period of time for consultation with the patient's attending physician;
(4) The patient's parents;
(5) An adult sibling of the patient or, if there is more than one adult sibling,
a majority of the patient's adult siblings who are available within a reasonable
period of time for such consultation;
(6) The nearest adult who is not described in divisions (B3)(1) to (5) of this
section, who is related to the patient by blood or adoption, and who is available
within a reasonable period of time for such situation.
(7) AN ADULT WITH A SIGNIFICANT PERSONAL RELATIONSHIP
TO THE PATIENT.
(C) If an appropriate individual or class of individuals entitled to decide
under division (B) of this section whether or not to consent to the withholding or
withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment for a patient is not available within a
reasonable period of time for such consultation and competent to so decide, or
declines to so decide, then the next priority individual or class of individuals
specified in that division is authorized to make the decision. However, an equal
division in a priority class of individuals under that division does not authorize
the next class of individuals specified in that division to make the decision. If an
equal division in a priority class of individuals under that division occurs, no
written consent to the withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment
from the patient can be given pursuant to this section.
(D)(1) A decision to consent pursuant to this section to the use or
continuation, or the withholding or withdrawal, of life-sustaining treatment for a
patient shall be made in good faith.
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(2) Except as provided in division (D)(4) of this section, if the patient
previously expressed his intention with respect to the use or continuation, or the
withholding or withdrawal, of life-sustaining treatment should he subsequently
be in a terminal condition or in a permanently unconscious state, whichever
applies, and no longer able to make informed decisions regarding the
administration of life-sustaining treatment, a consent given pursuant to this
section shall be valid only if it is consistent with that previously expressed
intention.
(3) Except as provided in division (D)(4) of this section, if the patient did
not previously express his intention with respect to the use or continuation, or the
withholding or withdrawal, of life-sustaining treatment should he subsequently
be in a terminal condition or in a permanently unconscious state, whichever
applies, and no longer able to make informed decisions regarding the
administration of life-sustaining treatment, a consent given pursuant to this
section shall be valid only if it is consistent with the type of informed consent
decision that the patient would have made if he previously had expressed his
intention with respect to the use or continuation, or the withholding or
withdrawal, of life-sustaining treatment should he subsequently be in a terminal
condition or in a permanently unconscious state, whichever applies, and no
longer able to make informed decisions regarding the administration of lifesustaining treatment, as inferred from the lifestyle and character of the patient,
and from any other evidence of the desires of the patient, prior to his becoming
no longer able to make informed decisions regarding the administration of lifesustaining treatment, OR WHERE THE WISHES OF THE PATIENT ARE
UNKNOWN OR UNCLEAR, WHETHER A CONSENT PURSUANT TO THIS
SECTION IS CONSISTENT WITH THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE
PATIENT. The Rules of Evidence shall not be binding for purposes of this
division.
(4)(a) The attending physician of the patient, and other health care
personnel acting under the direction of the attending physician, who do not have
actual knowledge of a previously expressed intention as described in division
(D)(2) of this section or who do not have actual knowledge that the patient would
have made a different type of informed consent decision under the
circumstances described in division (D)(3) of this section, may rely on a consent
given in accordance with this section unless a probate court decides differently
under division (F) of this section.
(b) The immunity conferred by division (C)(1-) of section 2133.11 of the
Revised Code is not forfeited by an individual who gives a consent to the use or
continuation, or the withholding or withdrawal, of life-sustaining treatment for a
patient under division (B) of this section if the individual gives the consent in
good faith and without actual knowledge, at the time of giving the consent, of
either a contrary previously expressed intention of the patient, or a previously
expressed intention of the patient, as described in division (C)(2) of this section,
that is revealed to the individual subsequent to the time of giving the consent.
(E) THIS CHAPTER DOES NOT IMPAIR, AND SHALL NOT BE
CONSTRUED AS IMPAIRING, ANY EXISTING AUTHORITY TO ISSUE A
DO NOT RESUSCITATE ORDER WHEN THE PATIENT HAS NOT
EXECUTED AN ADVANCE DIRECTIVE.
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(E)
Within forty-eight hours aftera pririty individual or rlass of
individuals gives a consent pursuant to this section to the use or continutnc
mniae the
mm
the withholding or withdrawal, of life sustaining Atment an
consent to the patient's attending physician, any individual describedi
divisions (B3)(1) to (5) of this section who objects to the application of this
section to the patient shall advise the attending physieian of the groeunds for the
ncmunieated to the atending physician, then,
objection. if an objectio iss
within two business days after that conmunication, the objecting individual
shall file a complaint against the priority individual or class of indiials
h
patient's attending physician, and the consulting physician associated with the
determination that the patient is in at termninal condition or that the patin
currfently is and for at least the immediately preceding twelve molnths has beni
: county in which the
a pemanently unconsciou s, in the probate ou of the
painslocated for the issuance of an order reversing the consent of the priorit
individual or class of individuals. If the objecting individual fails to So fil"
complaint, his objectionts shall be consider~ed to be void. A proebate eo~i
which a complaint is filed in accordance with this division shall conduct
hearing on the complaint after a copy of the complaint and a notice of the heaing
have been sefved upon the defendants. The clerk of the probate eouft in which
the complaint is filed shall cause the complaint and the noetice of the hearingtob
se served in accordance with the Rules of Civil Procedure, which service shall
be made, if possible, within three days aifter the filing of the complaint. The
heafng shall be eenducted at the eerliest possible timne, but no later than the thir
business day after such service has been completed. Immfediately following-the
heafng, the eouft shall enter on its journal its determinaition whether the decisio
of the priority individual or class of individuals to consent to the use ei
continuation, or the withholding or withdrawal, of life sustann tratent in
connection with the patient will be confiffned or reversed.
(2) if the decision of the priority individual or class of individuals was to
consent to the use or continuation of life sutnig tram nincnnection with
the patient, the eour- only mnay reverse that conse~nt if the objecting individua
establishes, by clear and convincing evidence and, if applicable, to a reasonable
degree of mnedical cenainty and in accordance with the applicable standards, one
or morfe of the following:
(F)(Fd(1) A PETITION MAY BE FILED UNDER SECTION 2101.24 FOR
ANY ONE OR MORE OF THE FOLLOWING PURPOSES:
(a) DETERMINING WHETHER the patient is able to make informed
decisions regarding the administration of life-sustaining treatment.
(b) DETERMINING WHETHER THE PATIENT IS IN A TERMINAL
CONDITION OR PERMANENT UNCONSCIOUS STATE.
i intent
(b) The patient has a legally effective declaration that drse
should he be determined to be in a terminal condition ori aprannl
uncnsios state, whichever applies, or a legally effective durable powero
attorney for health care.
(c) DETERMINING WHETHER the decision to use or continue lifesustaining treatment is not consistent with the previously expressed intention of
the patient as described in division (D)(2) of this section.
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(d) DETERMINING WHETHER the decision to use or continue lifesustaining treatment is not consistent with the type of informed consent decision
that the patient would have made if he previously had expressed his intention
with respect to the use or continuation, or the withholding or withdrawfal, of lifesustaining treatment should he subsequently be in a terminal condition or in a
permanently unconscious state, whichever applies, and no longer able to make
informed decisions regarding the administration of life-sustaining treatment or
THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE PATIENT as described in division (D)(3) of
this section.
(e) DETERMINING WHETHER the decision of the priority individual or
class of individuals was not made after consultation with the patient's attending
physician and after receipt of information from the patient's attending physician
or a consulting physician that is sufficient to satisfy the requirements of informed
consent.
(f) DETERMINING WHETHER the priority individual, or any member of
the priority class of individuals, who made the decision to use or continue lifesustaining treatment was not of sound mind or did not voluntarily make the
decision.
(g) if the decision of a priority class of individuas under division (B)(3) of
tin, s

ast
ft.

flive

Y
V

,

i

, par aflt

a

att

i r,
nt

p

y..,IJOi-l

l

tn AV
ii.L
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faith eff-rt, and use reasonable diligene, to notify the patient's adult hildre t
who were alvailable within a reasonable period of timne for consultatint -as
described in division (A)( 1)(e) of this section.
(h) The decision of the priority individual or class of individuals otherwise
was made in a manner that does not comply with this section.
(3) if the decision of the priority individual or! class of individuals was to
consent to the withholding er withdrawal of life sustaining treatment in
connection with the patient, the court ontly may reverse that consent if the
objecting individual establishes, by a preponderance of the evidence and, -if
applicable, to a reasonable degree of mcedieal erftainty and in accordance with
reasonable mnedical standards, onc or more of the following:
int in a termninal condition, the patient is not int a
(a) The ptet
permnanenitly unconscious -state, or the patient has not been in a permnanently
uncnscousstate for at least the immediately preceding twelvemots
(b) The paient is able to make informed decisions r!egadn
h
aidmnifistration o-fiffe sust-Aining treatmnent.
(e) There is a reasonable possibility that the patient will regain the capacity
to make informed decisions regarding the administration of life sustaing
tfeafnent.
(d) The patient has a legally effective declaration that addresses his infterA
should he be determinted to be in a terminal conditiont or int a permantently
uncnscousstate, whichever applies, or a legally effective durable power ot
attomey for health care.
(e) The decision to withold or withdraww life sustaining treatment is not
consistent with the previously t-~prt-esed intention of the patient as described in
division (ED)(2) of this section.
(f) The decision to withhold or withdraw life sustaining tr-eatment is nt
consistent with the type of iforemed consent decisiont that the patient would hav
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1993

53

Akron Law Review, Vol. 26 [1993], Iss. 2, Art. 5

282

AKRON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 26: 2

made if he previously had expressed his intention with respeet to the use e1
eentinuation, or the withholding or withdrawal, of life sustaining treatment
should he subsequently be in a terminal eonditiont or in
p ermntly

unconscious state, whiehever! applies, and no longer able to akle informedr
decisions regarding the administration 3of life sustaining treatment as described in
diyisien (D)(3) of this scin
(g) The decision of the priority individual or lass of individuals was no
mnade after consultationt with the patient's attending physician and after receipt-of
or a contsulting physiciant tha
.
iformationt from the patient's attendling pyica
consent.
ofinfoLmed
is sufficient to satisfy the requirements
(h) The priority individual, or any mnember of the priority class et
individuals, who mnade the decisiont to withhold or withdraw life sustann
treatmnent was noet of sound mnind or: did noet voluntarily make the decisien.
(i) if the decision of a priority class of individuals under division (B)(3) of
this section is involved, the patient's attending physician did not make a good
faith effort, and use reasonable diligence, to noetify the patient's adult childre
who were available within a reasonable period of time for consultation as
described in division (A)(l)(c) of this section.
6) The decision of the priority individual or class of individuals ethewise
was mnade in a manner that does noet comply with this section.
(")(2) A PETITION MAY BE FILED BY ANY OF THE FOLLOWING:
(a) THE PATIENT
(b) THE ATTORNEY-IN-FACT OR DESIGNEE OF THE PATIENT.
(c) THE GUARDIAN OF THE PATIENT.
(d) THE SPOUSE, ADULT CHILD, PARENT OR SIBLING OF THE
PATIENT.
(e) AN ADULT WITH A SIGNIFICANT PERSONAL RELATIONSHIP
TO THE PATIENT.
(f) THE AT-ENDING PHYSICIAN OR HEALTH CARE PROVIDER OF
THE PATIENT.
(4)(3) Notwithstanding any contrary provision of the Revised Code or of
the Rules of Civil Procedure, the state and persons other than individuals
described in divisions (F)(2) (B)(1) t*o(5) of this section are prohibited from
filing a complaint under division (E)(F) of this section and from joining or being
joined as parties to a hearing conducted under division (E)(F) of this section,
including joining by way of intervention.
(G)(F) A valid consent given in accordance with this section supersedes any
general consent to treatment form signed by or on behalf of the patient prior to,
upon, or after his admission to a health care facility to the extent there is a
conflict between the consent and the form.
(H)(G) Life-sustaining treatment shall not be withheld or withdrawn from a
patient pursuant to a consent given in accordance with this section if she is
pregnant and if the withholding or withdrawal of the treatment would terminate
the pregnancy, unless the patient's attending physician and one other physician
who has examined the patient determine, to a reasonable degree of medical
certainty and in accordance with reasonable medical standards, that the fetus
would not be born alive.
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2133.09 Conditions for withholding or withdrawing nutrition and hydration
from patient who has ben inapcmncntly unconscious state for atlet
twelve4, months
(A) The attending physieian of a patient who is an adult and who eurfently
is and for at least the immfediately precedinig twelve mnths has beent in n-

state mnay withhold or withdraw nutrition and
permanently un sis
hyration in connectiont with the patient only if all f the following apply:
(1) Written conisent to the withholding or withdrawal of life sustaining
treatmnent in connectiont with the patient has been given by an appropriate
individual or individuals in aeeordanee with seetion 2133.08 of the Revised
Code, and divisions (A) (I) (a) to (e) and (-2) of that section have been satisfied.
(2) A probate eeourt has not reversed the eonsent to the withholding oi
in conneetion with the patient
withdrawal of life sustang tatent
pursuant to division (E) of-sectpion'. 2 133.08 of the Revised Code.
(3) The attending physician of the patient and one other physician as
described in division (A)(2) of section 2133.08 of the Revised Code who
examines the patient detenn, igod faith, to a reasonable degree of mnedical
ce~int, ad in accordanc with reaso-nable medical standards, that nutrition
and hydration will not or nto longer will pro-vide eeomfon or alleviate pain int
cecetiont with the patient.
(4) Written consent to the withholding or withdrawal of nutrition and
by two individuals who
itesd
hydration in connection with the patiet
satisfy the witness eligibility criteri-a set ferth in division (B)(1) of section
2133.0-2 of the Revised Code, is given to the attending physiciant of the patient by
an a113proprte individual or: individuals as specified in division (B) of section
23 .0of.te Revised Code.
(5) The written consent to the withholding or withdrawal of the nutrition
and hydration in connection with the pain isgie in accordance with divisio
(B) of this section.
(6) The probate eouft of the county in which the patient is located issues an
order to withhold or withdraw the nutrition and hydration int connection withth
patien
punnat to division (C) of this secetion.
(B()Adecision to consent purfsuant to this section to the withholding of
witdrwalofnutrition and hydration int enneetin with a patient shall be mnade
ift geed faith
(-2) Eycept as provided in divisiont (B3)(4) of this section, if the patient
previouisly expressed his intention with respect to the use or continluation, or the
withholding or withdrawal, of ntutritiont and hydration should he subsequently
be int a pennaniently unconsciouis state and no longer able to make infonned
decisions regardinig the administration of nutrition mnd hydration a conen
gie pursat to this section shall be valid only if it is consi tt vith that
previouisly expressed intention.
(3) Except as provided int division (B)(4) ef this seetion, if the patient did
net previouisly express his intention with respect to the use or continuation, eoi
the withholding or withdrawal, of nutrition and hydm-tien shouildhesbqutl
be in a pennanently uncontscious state and no longer able tomaeifme
decisions regarding the admintistratien of nutrition anld hydration, a conisent
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gi"nprsat to this section shall be -validonily if it is eonsistent with the type
o-firmed eonsent decision that the patient would have made if he previutsly
had expressed his intention with respect to the use or eotnain
or the
withholding or withdrawal, of nutrtn an yrtiont Should he sube
FFnl-be
m~
iaprmanently uncoenscious state and no longer able to makenom
decins regardinig the admintistration of nuetritiont and hydration, as iniferred
from the lifestyle and chaater of the patient, and from any other evidence 31
*the desires of the patient, prior to his becoming no loniger able to maakc
informed decisions regarding the administrationt of nutrfition and hydration.;
The Rules of Evidencee shall not be binding for pur-pses of this division.
(4)(a) The attending physiciant of the patient, and other health care
personnel acting unfder the direction of the attending physician, who do net
have aetual knowledge of a previously expressed intention as described in
division (B)(2) of this section or who do not have actual knewledge that the
ptentwuld have made a diff-erent type of iforemed consent decision undef
t-he eifreumsaees described int divisiont (B)(3) of this section, may rely on
consenit gie in accodance with this section unless a probate courft decides
differentfly uinder division (C) of this section.
(b) The imamunity conferred by divisiont (G)(2) of sectiont 2133.11 of the
Revised Code is noet foffeited by an individual who gives a contsentt to the
withholdi0ng or withdrawal of nuttritiont and hydration int connection with
patient under diivisionf (A)(4) of this section if the individual gives the conisent in
good faith And w, ithout aetial kow .ledge, at the time of giving the consenit, et
either a eon"r~ previously expressed intention of the patient, or-a previously
expressed intention of the patient, as described in division (B)(2) of this scin
that is revealed to the individual subsequent to the timne of giving the conset
(G)(1) Prior to the withholding or withdrawal of ntutrition and hydration in
ee etion with a pati.e p.ursut to this section, the priority individual or-class
of individuals that c.-sAned to the withholding or withdra.wal of the nutritio
and hydraion shall apply to the probaote- court of the county in which the patient
is located for the issuancPPeof An"or.der that authorizes the attending physician o
the patient to comence the withholdinig or withdrawal of the nutrition and
hydraftion int connection with the patient. Upon the filing of the application, the
.lerk of the prba.te court shal schedule a hearin
...
an
t d causecopy
a
of it an
a notice of the hearing to be setwed in accordance with the Rules of Civil
Proceedure upon the applicant, the attending physician, the consulting physicia
associated with the determinationt that nutrition and hydration will noet or fie
longer will provide coforet or alleviate pain in cecetiont with the patient, and
the inidividuials described in divisionts (B)(l) to (5) of section 2133.08 of the
Revised Code who are not applicants, which service shall be made, if possible,
within three days after the filing of the appication. The hearing shall bc
coniducted at the earliest possible timne, but no sooner than the thirtieth businiess
day, and noe later than the sixtieth business day, after suceh service has been
eampleted. At the heaig an individual described int divisions (B)( 1) to (5) o
secton 233.8
ofthe evieCde who is not an applicant and who disagrees
with the decision of the priority individual or class of inidividuas to consent to
the withholding or withdrawal of ntrition and hydration int connectiont with the
patient shall be pefmitted to testify and present evidence relative to the use ei
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Continuation of nutrition and hydrationt in.

.nnectiont
with the patien.
Immfediately following the heafing, the court shall enter en its journal its
determination whether the requested order will be issued.
(2) The court shall issue an order that authorizes the patient's attending
physieian to commence the withholding or withdrawal of nutritiefn anid hydration
in conneetin with the patient .nly if the applants establish, by lear and
covncn e videncee, to a reasonable degree of mnedical certainty, and in
with..-reasonable mnedical standards, all of the followig.:

ac..dane

(a) Th penty
tw-AW. MRnth~ hxiQ

is and for at least the immediately preceding
in A

I]PPAI;Ql
unn~iAIIQ Q*tt

(b) The patient nie loniger is able to make informned decisionis regardingth
admiistfation of life sugtalnine treatment.
(e) Threin
enable possibility that the patient will regain the
capcit tomake iforemed decisionts regarding the administrationf
ife
sustaining

treatment.

(d) The conditions specified in divisions (A)(1) to (4) of this section have
beeftsatsfied:
(e) The decisiont to withhold or withdraw nutritiont and hydration in
connection- with the patient is consistent with the previously expressed intentio
of the patient as described in divisiont (13)(2) of this section or!is consistent with
the type of informed consent decision that the patient would have made if he
previously had expressed his intention with respect to the use or ntinuation, oi
the withholding or withdrawal, of ntutrition and hydrationf should h
subsequently be in a permanently unconscious state and no longer able to m.ke
iforemed deciin regarding the administrationt of nutftion and hydration as
descibed in division (B)(3) of this section
(3) Notwithstanding any eeatre~' provision of the Revised Code or of th
Rules of Civil Procedure, the state and persons other than individuals described
in division (A)(4) of this section or in divisions (B)(l) to (5) of section 2133.
of the Revised Code and ther than the attending physician and onsultin
physician associated with the detenination that nutrition and hydration will lt
or no longer will provide cfnet or alleviate pain if aonnectiotn with the patient
are prohibited fromn filing an application uinder this division and from joining Of
being joined apristoa
hearing conducted under this division, ineluding
joining by way of interventioni.
(D) consent
A vaid g
iven
accordance
in
wi
th this sectio supersedes any
gened Consent to treatment for signed by or ot behalf of the patient prir to,
upon, or after his admission to a health care facility to the extent there is
conflict between the consent and the formn.
2133.10 Transfer of patient to physician or facility willing to comply.
(A) An attending physician who, or a health care facility in which a
qualified patient or other patient is confined that, is not willing or not able to
comply or allow compliance with a declaration of a qualified patient, with a
consent given in accordance with section 2133.08 -o---2133.0
of the
Revised Code, with any probate court order issued pursuant to section 2133.05,~
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OR 2133.08, or 2133.09 of the Revised Code, or with any other applicable
provision of this chapter shall not prevent or attempt to prevent, or unreasonabl
delay or attempt to unrcmasefnably delay, the trantsfer of the qualified patient 01
other patient to the eare of a physieian who, or a health care facility that, is
willing and able to so mply or allow .mpliane. TAKE REASONABLE
STEPS AS PROMPTLY AS PRACTICABLE TO TRANSFER CARE OF THE
PATIENT TO ANOTHER PHYSICIAN OR HEALTH CARE FACILITY WHO
IS WILLING TO DO SO.
(B) If a declaration provides for the use or continuation of life-sustaining
treatment should its declarant subsequently be in a terminal condition or in a
permanently unconscious state, if a consent decision of a priority individual or
class of individuals under section 2133.08 of the Revised Code is to use or
continue life-sustaining treatment in connection with a patient described in that
section, or if a probate court issues aN feeva'aatien order pursuant to section
2133.05 or 2133.08 of the Revised Code that is intended to result in the use or
continuation of life-sustaining treatment in connection with a qualified patient or
other patient, then the attending physician of the qualified patient or other
patient who, or health care facility in which the qualified patient or other patient
is confined that, is not willing or not able to comply or allow compliance with the
declaration, consent decision, or reeval.tie. order shall use or continue the
life-sustaining treatment or cause it to be used or continued until a transfer as
described in division (A) of this section is made.
2133.11 Immunity
disciplinary action.

from

civil

or

criminal liability or professional

(A) Subject to division (D) of this section, an attending physician,
consulting physician, health care facility, and health care personnel acting under
the direction of an attending physician are not subject to criminal prosecution, are
not liable in damages in a tort or other civil action, and are not subject to
professional disciplinary action for any of the following:
(1) Giving effect to a declaration, if the physician, facility, or personnel
gives effect to the declaration in good faith and does not have actual knowledge
that the declaration has been revoked or does not substantially comply with this
chapter;
(2) Giving effect to a consent under the circumstances described in section
2133.08 of the Revised Code, if the physician, facility, or personnel gives effect
to the consent in good faith and does not have actual knowledge that the consent
is invalid under that section and if a probate court has not issued an order
reversing the consent pursuant to division (F)(-E) of that section;
(3) Giving effect to a consent under the circ.umstances deser ibed in sectien
2133.09 of the Revised Cede, if the physician, facility, or personnel gives effect
to the consent in goed fiait and does not have actual knowledge that the contsent
is inivalid under that sectiont and if the approepriate probate court has issued an
order authorizing the withholding or withdrawal of nutrition and hydration in
connectiont with the pafient int quest.ion;
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(3)(4) Refusing to or not being able to comply or allow compliance with a
declaration of a qualified patient, with a consent given in accordance with
section 2133.08 or-2133.9 of the Revised Code, with a probate .court order
issued pursuant to section 2133.05; OR 2133.08, or- 2133.99 of the Revised
Code, or with another applicable provision of this chapter, if the refusal or
inability to comply or allow compliance is in good faith, provided that, in the
case of an attending physician or health care facility, whichever of the following
apply are satisfied:
(a) THE ATTENDING PHYSICIAN OR HEALTH CARE FACILITY
HAS TAKEN REASONABLE STEPS AS PROMPTLY AS PRACTICABLE
TO TRANSFER CARE OF THE PATIENT TO ANOTHER PHYSICIAN OR
HEALTH CARE FACILITY WHO IS WILLING TO DO SO. does .et-pre.t
or attempt to prevent, or unreasonably delay or attempt to unrcasefnably delay,
the transfer of the qualified patient or other! patients to the eare of a physieian
who, or a health eare facility that, is willing and able to so comply or allo
eemplinnee(b) If the declaration of the qualified patient provided for the use or
continuation of life-sustaining treatment should the declarant subsequently be in
a terminal condition or in a permanently unconscious state, if the consent
decision of a priority individual or class of individuals under section 2133.08 of
the Revised Code was to use or continue life-sustaining treatment in connection
with the patient described in that section, or if the probate court issued a
reva..atie. order pursuant to section 2133.05 or 2133.08 of the Revised Code
that was intended to result in the use or continuation of life-sustaining treatment
in connection with the qualified patient or other patient, then the attending
physician or health care facility used or continued the life-sustaining treatment or
caused it to be used or continued until a transfer as described in division
(A)(4)(a) of this section was made.
(4)(5) Making determinations other than those described in division (B) of
this section, or otherwise acting under this chapter, if the determinations or other
actions are made in good faith and in accordance with reasonable medical
standards.
(B) Subject to division (D) of this section, an attending or consulting
physician is not subject to criminal prosecution, is not liable in damages in a tort
or other civil action, and is not subject to professional disciplinary action if the
physician makes any of the following determinations in good faith, to a
reasonable degree of medical certainty, and in accordance with reasonable
medical standards:
(1) A determination that a declarant or a patient as described in section
2133.08 of the Revised Code is in a terminal condition;
(2) A determination that a declarant is in a permanently unconscious state;
(3) A determination that a patient as described in section 2133.08 of the
Revised Code currently is and for at least the immediately pr-eding twelve
months has been in a permanently unconscious state;
(4) A determination that a declarant or a patient as described in section
2133.08 of the Revised Code no longer is able to make informed decisions
regarding the administration of life-sustaining treatment;
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(5) A determination that there is no reasonable possibility that a declarant
or a patient as described in section 2133.08 of the Revised Code will regain the
capacity to make informed decisions regarding the administration of lifesustaining treatment;
(6) A determination that nutritiefn or hydration will not or no longer wil
provide coforet or allevaepi i conneetion with a patient as described-in
section 2133.09 of the

Revis

Cod.

.

(C)(-) Subject to division (D) of this section, an individual who is
authorized to give a consent to the use or continuation, or the withholding or
withdrawal, of life-sustaining treatment under division (B) of section 2133.08 of
the Revised Code and who makes his decision in good faith is not subject to
criminal prosecution, is not liable in damages in a tort or other civil action, and
is not subject to professional disciplinary action in connection with that decision.
(2) Subject to division (D) of this section, an individual who is authorized to
iveamnisent to the withholding or withdrawal of nutrition and hydration
connection with a patient tinde division
r
(A)(4) of section 2133.09 ofth
Revised Code and who gives the consent in good faith is not subject to crimfina
prosecu t, is not liable in damages in a tort or other civil aetion, and is no
subject to professional disciplinary action int connection with that conisent.
(D) This section does not grant, and shall not be construed as granting, an
immunity from criminal or civil liability or from professional disciplinary action
to health care personnel for actions that are outside the scope of their authority.
2133.12 Death is not a suicide or homicide; health or life insurance or
annuity rights not affected; no presumption created; limitations on effect of
chapter; comfort care.
(A) The death of a qualified patient or other patient resulting from the
withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment in accordance with this
chapter does not constitute a suicide, aggravated murder, murder, or any other
homicide offense for any purpose.
(B)(1) The execution of a declaration shall not do either of the following:
(a) Affect the sale, procurement, issuance, or renewal of any policy of life
insurance or annuity, notwithstanding any term of a policy or annuity to the
contrary;
(b) Be deemed to modify or invalidate the terms of any policy of life
insurance or annuity that is in effect on the effective date of this section.
(2) Notwithstanding any term of a policy of life insurance or annuity to the
contrary, the withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment from an
insured, qualified patient or other patient in accordance with this chapter shall not
impair or invalidate any policy of life insurance or annuity.
(3) Notwithstanding any term of a policy or plan to the contrary, the use or
continuation, or the withholding or withdrawal, of life-sustaining treatment from
an insured, qualified patient or other patient in accordance with this chapter shall
not impair or invalidate any policy of health insurance or any health care benefit
plan.
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(4) No physician, health care facility, other health care provider, person
authorized to engage in the business of insurance in this state under Title
XXXIX [39] of the Revised Code, medical care corporation, health care
corporation, health maintenance organization, other health care plan, legal entity
that is self-insured and provides benefits to its employees or members, or other
person shall require any individual to execute or refrain from executing a
declaration, or shall require an individual to revoke or refrain from revoking a
declaration, as a condition of being insured or of receiving health care benefits or
services.
(C)(I) This chapter does not create, and shall not be construed as creating,
any presumption concerning the intention of an individual who has revoked or
has not executed a declaration with respect to the use or continuation, or the
withholding or withdrawal, of life-sustaining treatment if he should be in a
terminal condition or in a permanently unconscious state at any time.
(2) This chapter does not affect, and shall not be construed as affecting, the
right of a qualified patient or other patient to make informed decisions regarding
the use or continuation, or the withholding or withdrawal, of life-sustaining
treatment as long as he is able to make those decisions.
(3) This chapter does not require, and shall not be construed as requiring, a
physician, other health care personnel, or a health care facility to take action that
is contrary to reasonable medical standards.
(4) This chapter and, if applicable, a declaration do not affect or limit, and
shall not be construed as affecting or limiting, the authority of a physician or a
health care facility to provide or not to provide life-sustaining treatment to a
person in accordance with reasonable medical standards applicable in an
emergency situation.
(D) CONSISTENT WITH THE PROVISIONS OF THIS CHAPTER, THE
ATTENDING PHYSICIAN MAY ISSUE A DO NOT RESUSCITATE
ORDER.
(E)(D) Nothing in this chapter condones, authorizes, or approves of mercy
killing, assisted suicide, or euthanasia.
(F)(E-) This chapter does not affect, and shall not be construed as
affecting, the responsibility of the attending physician of a qualified patient or
other patient, or other health care personnel authorized to do so, to provide
comfort care to the patient.
(2)(a) if, at any time, a person described in divis ., ,-o )((i) of section
2 133.05 of the Revised Code or the individual or a majority of the individuals in
either of the first two classes of individuals that pertain to a deelarant int th
descending order of prioity set forth int division (A)(2)(a)(ii) of section 21330
of the Revised Code believes int good faith that both of the following
eirceumsanes apply, then the person or the individual or majority of individual
int either ot the first two classes ot individuals may commence an action inmn
probate court of the counfty in which a delaat who is a tefminal conditiont oi
iou tate is located for the issuance of an order mandating
permanently unos
the use or continuation of comfort e inton et with the declarant in
manfr er that is consistent with division (F)(1) of this section:
(i) Comfort care is noet being used or contintued in cecetiont with the
deele&
ant.L.1.A

.

IFO

t.LI.'y

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1993

LI

•yI.I

L

LJ.L

JLIIL

FIo

IL41L

61

Akron Law Review, Vol. 26 [1993], Iss. 2, Art. 5

290

AKRON LAW REviEw

[Vol. 26: 2

(Hi) The withholding or withdrawal of the comfort care is contrary to
division (F) (1) of this section.
(b) if a declarant did not designate in his declaration a person as describcd
in divisiont (A)(2)(a)(i) of section 2133.05 of the Revised Code and if, at any
tie rority individual or any maember of a priority class of individuals unde
diiin()(-2)(a)(ii) of sectiont 2133.05 of the Reviscd Code or, at anty timne,-the
individuaffl or a majority of the individuals in the next class of individuals that
pertains to the declarant in the descending order of priority set forth int that
division bclieves in good faith that both of the following circumfstancees apply,
then the priority individual, the mnember of the priority class of individuals, or the
individual or majority of individuals int the next class of individuals that pertains
to the declarant Fmay commencee an action in the probate court of the county i
which a declorfant who is in a terminal condition or permanently unconsciu
state is ioeatea fer the issuance of nt orofer manating the uise or conuinuanoen e1
comfort ce in~ntien with the declarant in a manner that is consistent with
division (F)(l) of this section:
(0)Comifort cure is not beinfg used or continued in connection with the
deean
(ii) The withholding or withdrawal of the coforet care is contrary to
division (F) (1) of this section.
() if-, at any time, a priority individual or any Member of a priority class et
individuals under division (B) of sectiont 2133.08 of the Revised Codc or, at any
timne, the individual or a majority of the individuals in the ntext classo
individuals that pertains to the patientt in the desendn ore3f priority set forth
int that division believes in good faith that both offhe fo.lwing circutmsmanc
apply, then the priority individual, the member of the priority class ot
individuals, or the individual or majority of individuals in the next class ot
individuals that pertains to the patient may comamence an action in the probat
coutrt of the county in which a patient as described in division (A) of section
2133.08 of the Revised Code is located forf the issuance of an order mandating
the use or continuation of coforet care in connection with thc patient i
manner, that is cnsistent with division (F)(1) of this section:
(i) Coforet car-e is not being used or continued in connection with the
(ii) The withholding or withdrawal of the comfort care is contrary to
division (F) (1) of this section.
2133.13 Assumption of validity of declaration.
In the absence of actual knowledge to the contrary and if acting in good
faith, an attending or consulting physician, other health care personnel, and
health care facilities may assume that a declaration complies with this chapter
and is valid.
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2133.14 Out-of-state declaration valid.
A declaration executed under the law of another state in compliance with
that law or in substantial compliance with this chapter shall be considered to be
valid for purposes of this chapter.

.2133.15 Application to document executed prior to effective date of
provisions.
(A) This chapter shall apply to any written document that was executed
anywhere prior to the effective date of this section, that voluntarily was so
executed by an adult who was of sound mind, that was signed by the adult or by
another individual at the direction of the adult, that was or was not witnessed or
acknowledged before a notary public as described in division (B) of section
2133.02 of the Revised Code, and that specifies the adult's intention with respect
to the use or continuation, or the withholding or withdrawal, of life-sustaining
treatment if he is at any time in a terminal condition, in a permanently
unconscious state, or in either a terminal condition or a permanently
unconscious state, if he is at that time no longer able to make informed decisions
regarding the administration of life-sustaining treatment, and if at that time
there is no reasonable possibility that he will regain the capacity to make those
informed decisions. The document shall be considered to be a declaration,
shall be given effect as if it had been executed after the effective date of this
section in accordance with this chapter, and, except as otherwise provided in
division (C) of thi section 2133.08(A)(1)(c), shall be subject to all provisions of
this chapter pertaining to declarations.
(B)(1) ifa declaratin as dcscribed in division (A) of this section does not
state that, or does not entain a checked or marked boy, or line adjaent to

statement indicating that, the deelarant auithorizes his attending physiciant to
withheld or withdraw nutrition or hydration when he is in a permanently
c

attending
and when his "state

physiian and at least one

the

physician who has examfinted himn determine, to a enable degree of mnedical
certainty and in accordance with reasonab-le medi-cal standards, that nutrition ot
hydration will not or no logA wilsne to provide coforet to himn or alleviat
his pain, then, if the declaration beoms peatv under section 2133.03 -of
the Revised Code because the deelamm is in a permanently uncoenscious state,
the attending physician of the deelarfant shall apply to the probate outrt of the
eeounty int which the declaat is located for the issuancee of an order whether ei
not the attending physician is required to provide the deelarant with nutrition an
hydration for as long as the deelarant is int the permanently unconsciouts stae
Upon the filing of the application, the clerk of the probate court shall schedule -a
hear-ng on it and iause a copy of it and a notice of the heafing to be served in
accordance with the Rules of Civil Procedure urpof the attending physician and
the individuals described in divisions (B) (1) to (5) of section 2133.08 of th
Revised Code, which service shall be mnade, if possible, within three days ate
the filing of the application. The heafing shall be conducted at the earflies
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tflffa
Business flay.I ane no efaMar
DOessible
..
.. timne.
. 7 out
...... no sooner tnan tme Etinet
sixtieth business day, after suceh ser-vice has been completed.
(2) At the hearinig, the attending physician and any individual described in
to testify and present evidence relative to the use or continutoo the
withholding or withdrawal, of nutition and hydration foroas
ah
elar
is in the permanently unosiu tate. immediately following the hearing, the
court shall eniter on its journal its determination, based on the evidence presented
by all of the par-ies at the hearing on the applicationt and subject to divisio
(C)(3) of this sectiont 2133.08, whether or not the attending physica is reqired
to provide the deelffant with nutrition and hydratioAn for -as long as he is in the
permanently uinconscious state.
(3) The court shall issue an order that authorizes the deelarant's attending
physician to commfence the withholding or withdrawal of ntutritiont antd
hydration in conneetion with the declafant only if the applicant establishes,-by
clear and onnineidence, that the order wouild be contsistent with oneo
the fellewing.
(a) The deelafant's previously expressed intention with respect to the use ei
conitinuation, or the withholding or withdrawal, of nutrition and hydration should
he subsequently be int a permanently unconsciouis state and noe longer able to
make informed decisions regarding the administration of ntutrition and hydration;
(b) in the absence of such a previously expressed intention, the type et
informed contsent decisiont that the deelarant would have made if he had
expressed his intention with respect to the use or cotnain or the withholding
or withdrawal, of nutrition and hydration should hesubsequently be in -permanently uncoenscious state and noe longer able to make informed decision
regarding the administration of nutritiont and hydration, as iniferred from the
lifestyle and character! of the deelar-ant, and froem any other evidence of the
deelaat's desires, prior to his beoign
longer able to maeke iniformed
decisions regarding the administr-ation of nutrlitiont and hydr-ation. The Rules
of Evidencee shall net be binding for pufposes of t~s division).
(4) Notwithstanding any cotrr prov'ision of the Revised Code or of the
Rules of Civil Proceedure, the state and persons other than individuals described
int divisions (B)(1) to (5) of section 2133.08 of the Revised Code and other tha
the attending physiciant of the declarantt are prohibited from filing an appication
under this division and fromn joining or being joined as parties to a hearn
conducted under this division, includig joi g by way of intefventiefn.
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